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INTRODUCTION
It has now become common, at least among progressive
criminal justice scholars, to argue that the criminal justice
system could be fixed—or at least greatly improved—if we simply regulated prosecutors more. If we curbed their unfettered
discretion.1 If they sought less harsh punishments. Or if they
charged fewer people, which arguably has contributed more to
mass incarceration than the War on Drugs.2 If we required
† Professor of Law and Director of the Center on Race, Law, and Justice,
Fordham Law School. B.A. Princeton University; J.D. Columbia Law School. Assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York 1995–2004. E-mail: capers@fordham.edu. This Article benefited from presentations at NYU School of
Law’s Policing Colloquium; faculty workshops at Albany Law School, University of
Nevada Las Vegas Law School, GW Law School, Suffolk University Law School,
University of Georgia School of Law, New York Law School, Brooklyn Law School,
Fordham Law School; and from presentations at CrimFest and the Law and Society Conference. For comments, suggestions, and feedback, I am especially grateful to Miriam Baer, Alice Ristroph, Deborah Weissman, Ronald Wright, Bruce
Green, Olivier Sylvain, Cynthia Lee, Roger Fairfax, Kate Weisburd, Eric Miller,
Barbara Fedders, Leigh Goodmark, Julia Simon-Kerr, Jeremy Bearer-Friend,
Thea Johnson, Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Anna Roberts, Jenny Roberts, Sandra
Mayson, Daniel Greenwood, Rachel Barkow, Barry Friedman, Jocelyn Simonson,
Rachel Harmon, Stephanos Bibas, Robin Lenhardt, Youngjae Lee, and Jed
Shugerman. Hector Melendez and Alanna Phillips provided invaluable research
assistance.
1
ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
15–17, 192–94 (2007).
2
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 206 (2017) (concluding that “[p]rosecutors have been
and remain the engines driving mass incarceration”); see also EMILY BAZELON,
CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS
INCARCERATION 77–81 (2019) (arguing that prosecutors bear much of the responsibility for over-incarceration).
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them to have open file discovery—the ’220 norm in civil cases—
instead of keeping evidence, even exculpatory evidence, close to
the vest.3 If they confronted their implicit biases about race
and class and everything else.4 If we limited their power to
coerce pleas5 or fixed things so the prosecutors who investigate
and advocate are not the same prosecutors who in effect adjudicate decisions.6 The suggestions continue. If we elected progressive prosecutors.7 If we at least leveled the funding
between prosecutors and public defenders.8 I too made some
of these arguments.9 Not anymore.
3
Cf. Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 43, 57–58 (2015)
(exploring timing and institutional design as a way to increase prosecutorial compliance with discovery obligations). See generally Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting
Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 514 (2009) (arguing for open-file discovery); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1637 (2005) (similar).
4
Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1139–42 (2012) (discussing implicit biases among prosecutors); Robert J. Smith
& Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2012) (arguing that
“implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes skew prosecutorial decisions in a range
of racially biased ways”).
5
See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From
Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1151–60 (2011)
(proposing protections for defendants who enter into plea bargains similar to
protections for consumer contracts); I. Bennett Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, 57
WM & MARY L. REV. 1277, 1299–1305 (2016) [hereinafter Capers, The Prosecutor’s
Turn] (discussing plea bargaining in the context of the Due Process Clause); Eric
S. Fish, Against Adversary Prosecution, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1419, 1444–45 (2018)
(“American criminal justice is essentially a system of negotiated dispositions administered by prosecutors.”).
6
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 898 (2009) (arguing
that borrowing from the institutional design inherent in administrative law
checks could do much to rein in prosecutorial excess).
7
BAZELON, supra note 2, at 147–95; Angela J. Davis, The Progressive Prosecutor: An Imperative for Criminal Justice Reform, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (2018)
(urging the election of more progressive prosecutors); cf. David Alan Sklansky, The
Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 27 (2017)
(providing ten suggestions of “best practices” for progressive district attorneys).
8
WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 299 (2011);
David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Rhetoric and
the Reality, 32 LAW & INEQ. 371, 377–82 (2014) (discussing the depth of the
funding crisis); Eve Brensike Primus, Defense Counsel and Public Defense, in 3
REFORMING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL AND TRIAL PROCESSES 121, 123–26 (Erik Luna
ed. 2017); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1733–35 (2005).
9
See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the Criminal, 20 YALE J. OF
L. & HUMAN. 1, 22–30 (2008) (overviewing exercises of perspective “switching” for
actors in the criminal justice system); Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 1259, 1299–1300 (2011) [hereinafter Capers, Real Rape Too] (arguing for
gender-neutrality and better training for prosecutors of sexual assault); Capers,
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The argument I put forward in this Article may seem radical, but if I may channel Ralph Ellison, “[b]ear with me.”10
Because I subscribe to the belief that “subject position is everything in my analysis of the law,”11 it is worth disclosing that I
come to this argument not just as a criminal justice scholar but
also as a former federal prosecutor. That argument is this: it is
time to turn away from prosecution as we know it. As a federal
prosecutor I put hundreds of defendants, mostly brown and
black and almost always poor, in prison as part of the War on
Drugs. But if the goal was to limit the influx of drugs in this
country, what I did was an abject failure.12 And it is not just
drug prosecutions. Even looking back on many of the other
cases I prosecuted involving victimless “crimes” I certainly
know I did more harm than good. I certainly contributed to
mass incarceration and to the separation of families. But to
what end?
Just consider. Each year our jails cycle through approximately ten million people, the vast majority charged with nonviolent crimes.13 We are at a point where one in every three
adults in America has a criminal record,14 and where for every
fifteen persons born in 2001, one will likely spend time in jail or
prison.15 Compared to other countries, the crime rate in the
The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 5, at 1299–1305 (discussing heightened due
process requirements for prosecutors who plea bargain).
10
RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN 12 (1952).
11
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 3 (1991) (“Since
subject position is everything in my analysis of the law, you deserve to know that
it’s a bad morning.”).
12
See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS 60 (rev. ed. 2012) (arguing that the war on drugs is the “single
most important cause of the explosion in incarceration rates in the United
States”). See generally STEVEN WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A
FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 8 (1990) (“One way or another, no matter what the War on
Drugs does to supply, the black market in cocaine will play its trump: it thrives on
enforcement, depends on it.”); PAULA MALLEA, THE WAR ON DRUGS: A FAILED EXPERIMENT 11 (2014) (“It is by now indisputable that the War on Drugs has failed in all of
its objectives.”).
13
ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 251210, JAIL INMATES IN 2016, at 1
(2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ji16.pdf [https://perma.cc/
TDW6-B2K4] (noting that “[j]ails reported 10.6 million admissions during 2016”).
14
CHIDI UMEZ & REBECCA PIRIUS, BARRIERS TO WORK: IMPROVING EMPLOYMENT IN
LICENSED OCCUPATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 1 (2018), https://
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/Labor/Licensing/criminalRecords_v06_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT77-R98T]; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, AMERICANS WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS 1 (2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/up
loads/2015/11/Americans-with-Criminal-Records-Poverty-and-OpportunityProfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3Z3-RLRP].
15
THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 197976, PREVALENCE OF
IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001 7 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BTT-SXDS].
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United States is not exceptional,16 and yet we have by far the
highest incarceration rate in the world.17 None of this can be
solved by simply tinkering with the machinery of prosecution.
It is time to rethink why and how we prosecute in the first
place.
What would it mean to turn away from public prosecutors
and not rely on the criminal justice system as the first responder to address social ills, such as mental illness and poverty (two of the main drivers of our prison industrial complex)?
More radically, what would it mean to turn away from statecontrolled prosecution as the primary way to address crime?
What would it mean to replace a system where prosecutors
hold a monopoly in deciding which cases are worthy of pursuit
with a system in which “we the people,” including those of us
who have traditionally had little power, would be empowered to
seek and achieve justice ourselves?
This Article attempts to answer these questions. It begins
in Part I with the enormous, monopolistic power public prosecutors wield. But this power is not inevitable. Indeed, public
prosecutors are not even inevitable. This is the main point of
Part II, which surfaces the rarely discussed history of criminal
prosecutions in this country before the advent of the public
prosecutor, when private prosecutions were the norm and in a
very real sense criminal prosecutions belonged to “the people.”
Part II then demonstrates that our history of private prosecutions and the turn to public prosecutions is more than just a
curious footnote, as this very history has, in turn, shaped criminal law and justice as we know it. Part III, in many ways the
core of this Article, makes the argument for turning away from
public prosecutors and restoring prosecution to the people. It
also returns to the question that motivates this Article: what
benefits might accrue if victims had the option to pursue criminal charges through private prosecution or public prosecution?
Part III argues there would be several benefits, including democratizing criminal justice and, quite possibly, reducing mass
incarceration.

16
See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 12,
126 (2013) (showing that the U.S. homicide rate is below the global average).
17
ROY WALMSLEY, INST. FOR CRIMINAL POLICY RESEARCH, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (12th ed. 2018).
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I
THE PROSECUTORS
Consider two fairly recent news stories: one that is not so
well known and one that has received national attention. In
May 2019, the New York Times began a story with the following
lines: “Evidence so neglected it grew mold. Calls to the authorities for help that went unanswered. Witnesses and victims who
were never interviewed.”18 The story was in part about the
failure of police and prosecutors to charge rape cases. Indeed,
in many respects that part of the story was familiar. According
to one recent study looking at rape reporting between 1995 and
2012, roughly a million reported “forcible vaginal rapes of female victims nationwide disappeared from the official
records”;19 police officers and prosecutors simply decided not
to prosecute them.20 Instead, prosecutors culled and chose the
few cases they wanted to pursue. What was less familiar was
the second part of the story: now, victims are trying to force
action. In various cities around the country, victims are actually suing to force police and district attorneys to investigate
and prosecute.21
The other story is better known and continues to receive
coverage nationwide. On July 7, 2019, a federal indictment
was unsealed in the Southern District of New York charging
financier Jeffrey Epstein with running a sex trafficking ring
between 2002 and 2005.22 The ring involved enticing and
18
Valeriya Safronova & Rebecca Halleck, These Rape Victims Had to Sue to
Get the Police to Investigate, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/05/23/us/rape-victims-kits-police-departments.html [https://
perma.cc/8ZK2-Z7YK].
19
Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden
Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1198, 1204 (2014).
20
As it stands now, prosecutors have full discretion in deciding which rape
cases to pursue and what redress to seek. As one scholar recently observed, this
approach “concomitantly reifies state power and positions the state as the savior
of women,” at least in the few cases the state does prosecute. See Erin Collins,
The Criminalization of Title IX, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 365, 371 (2016). This
discretion also results in prosecutors relying on non-legal factors in selecting
cases to pursue, such as which victims look like “good girls,” a selection process
that has class, race, and other status implications. See I. Bennett Capers, Real
Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 854–65 (2013) [hereinafter Capers, Real
Women, Real Rape].
21
Safronova & Halleck, supra note 18. The cities in which women have filed
lawsuits to force police and prosecutors to investigate and prosecute cases include Austin, San Francisco, Memphis, Houston, and Baltimore. Id.
22
Ali Watkins & Vivian Wang, Jeffrey Epstein is Accused of Luring Girls to His
Manhattan Mansion and Abusing Them, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-sex-trafficking.html
[https://perma.cc/Z4LX-8MKE].
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recruiting girls as young as fourteen to visit his mansion in
Manhattan and his estate in Palm Beach, Florida “to engage[ ]
in [paid] sex acts with him.”23 The indictment also charged
Epstein with paying his victims to recruit additional girls for
abuse and with creating “a vast network of underage victims for
him to sexually exploit.”24 A search of his mansion in Manhattan conducted to coincide with his arrest revealed hundreds of
sexually suggestive photographs of young girls who appear underage.25 While this and Epstein’s subsequent suicide made
the story newsworthy and gave it legs, the public and the news
talk shows also expressed outrage over the “secret plea deal”
Epstein received years earlier in a different case. That case was
based on similar evidence involving more than eighty victims;26
however, those prosecutors gave Epstein a “sweetheart” plea
deal.27 Under that earlier deal, prosecutors allowed Epstein to
bypass a life sentence to instead serve just a year in a Palm
Beach jail under terms that allowed him to leave the facility for
twelve hours each day, six days a week, so that he could work
from home.28 The prosecutors negotiated this plea in secret,
without informing Epstein’s victims.29 The prosecutors also
agreed to immunize Epstein’s unindicted co-conspirators.30
23
Indictment at 3, United States v. Epstein, 425 F. Supp. 3d 306 (S.D.N.Y.
2019) (No. 19–cr–490).
24
Watkins & Wang, supra note 22.
25
Ali Watkins, Jeffrey Epstein Is Indicted on Sex Charges as Discovery of
Nude Photos Is Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/07/08/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-charges.html [https://perma.cc/8ZANEFEK].
26
Julie K. Brown, Cops Worked to Put Serial Sex Abuser in Prison. Prosecutors Worked to Cut Him a Break, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 28, 2018), https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article214210674.html [https://perma.cc/
K8PP-Q4DJ]; Watkins & Wang, supra note 22.
27
See Watkins & Wang, supra note 22.
28
To add insult to injury, prosecutors routinely prosecute minors on charges
of prostitution while discounting the fact that they are also victims of statutory
rape. Cynthia Godsoe, Punishment as Protection, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1313, 1323–32
(2015).
29
Despite victims having the right to have their views heard pursuant to the
Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, the prosecutors kept the plea negotiations and
actual plea secret from victims until after the plea was entered. Though a federal
judge later ruled that the prosecutors violated CVRA, the judge stopped short of
invalidating the plea. See Doe 1 v. United States, 359 F. Supp. 3d 1201, 1217–22
(S.D. Fla. 2019); Julie K. Brown, Federal Prosecutors Broke Law in Jeffrey Epstein
Case, Judge Rules, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 21, 2019, 2:51 PM), https://
www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article226577419.html [https://
perma.cc/6XPR-L69Q].
30
Doe 1, 359 F. Supp. 3d at 1208. It was not just Florida prosecutors who
helped Epstein. At Epstein’s request, the District Attorney for Manhattan made a
motion to have Epstein’s sex registration status reduced to the lowest possible
classification. Jan Ransom, Cyrus Vance’s Office Sought Reduced Sex-Offender
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These two stories—victims suing to have their cases investigated and prosecuted, and the sweetheart deal Epstein received in Florida—are not just linked by the subject of sexual
assault. They are linked—and indeed, undergirded—by the
unbridled power of prosecutors. The power to charge or not
charge. The power to plead or not plead. And this power is
reflected in a range of cases. It runs the gamut from a Chicago
prosecutor’s decision to dismiss charges against the actor Jussie Smollett notwithstanding overwhelming evidence,31 to the
Department of Justice’s decision to forego charges against the
police officer who caused the death of Eric Garner by holding
him in an illegal chokehold while he protested that he was
unable to breathe,32 to prosecutors’ failure to charge any executive in connection with the financial collapse of 2008.33
Status for Epstein, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
07/09/nyregion/cyrus-vance-epstein.html [https://perma.cc/6MQ6-A6Z3].
Even though the Manhattan judge refused, in the end it did not matter. When
Epstein failed to comply with his registration, the Manhattan DA’s Office simply
looked the other way. Erin Donaghue, NYPD Says It Wasn’t Required to Monitor
Jeffrey Epstein’s Sex Offender Registration, CBS NEWS (July 11, 2019, 8:26 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/jeffrey-epstein-nypd-says-it-wasnt-requiredto-monitor-sex-offender-registration/ [https://perma.cc/D2ZQ-EWN2].
31
Julia Jacobs, Jussie Smollett Fights Appointment of Special Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMES (July 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/19/arts/television/
jussie-smollett-special-prosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/TH7F-NX2E]. This
power is also reflected in the subsequent decision of a special prosecutor to
pursue charges. See Julia Jacobs, Jussie Smollett Indicted Again in Attack That
Police Called a Hoax, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/02/11/arts/television/jussie-smollett-indicted-chicago.html [https://
perma.cc/LQ6K-B8K2]. Indeed, one could even say that the Jussie Smollett case
has become less about him than about prosecutorial power generally. See Paul
Butler, Paul Butler: The Real Target of the Jussie Smollett Charges is a Progressive
Prosecutor, CRIMESTORY (Feb. 17, 2020), https://crimestory.com/2020/02/17/
paul-butler-the-real-target-of-the-jussie-smollett-charges-is-a-progressive-prosecutor/ [https://perma.cc/T3EL-FJZ8].
32
Sharon Otterman, ‘The D.O.J. Has Failed Us’: Eric Garner’s Family Assails
Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/
nyregion/eric-garner-justice-department-charges.html?searchResultPosition=1
[https://perma.cc/VP96-LK5L].
33
See also Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the “Too Big to Jail” Financial
Institutions, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 517, 518–19 (2018) (noting that only lower level
officers and traders were prosecuted criminally, and that high level executives
were given immunity from prosecution); Nick Werle, Note, Prosecuting Corporate
Crime When Firms Are Too Big to Jail: Investigation, Deterrence, and Judicial
Review, 128 YALE L.J. 1366, 1370 (2019) (arguing that deterrence principles do
not function properly when firms are too big to jail); Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial
Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS
(Jan. 9, 2014) https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisiswhy-no-executive-prosecutions/?printpage=true [https://perma.cc/F43T-YU2X]
(criticizing the Department of Justice’s rationales for not prosecuting executives).
See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE
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Nor are prosecutors universally declining to pursue
charges or universally declining to enforce the laws vigorously,
either of which could be categorized as under enforcement. At
the same time prosecutors use their power to decline to pursue
some offenders, they also use their power to overcharge many
others. Some stories we know because they make the news or
are from Supreme Court opinions. The Alabama prosecutor
who indicted a pregnant woman on manslaughter charges because she got in an altercation resulting in another woman
shooting her in the stomach.34 The Connecticut prosecutor
who indicted Tanya McDowell, a poor black woman, on larceny
charges for enrolling her child in a better neighboring school
district in which she did not live, resulting in a five-year sentence.35 The California prosecutor who filed a three-strikes
charge against Gary Ewing, resulting in a mandatory twentyfive to life sentence for stealing three golf clubs worth less than
$1200.36 These are the stories that make the news or make it
to the Supreme Court. But there are also routine, quotidian
stories. The thirteen million misdemeanor cases that prosecutors file each year.37 The half a million prosecutions for marijuana possession.38 There is a reason John Pfaff, in his
analysis of mass incarceration, concluded that much of the
blame lies with prosecutors.39 The point is not just that we
should be troubled by how prosecutors exercise their power in
particular cases. The point is that we should be troubled by
how much power they have in the first place. And we should be
troubled by the fact that it tends to be the poor and the vulnerable who get the short end of the stick.
CORPORATIONS 6 (2014) (noting the rise of deferred prosecution agreements
instead of filing criminal cases against corporations).
34
Sarah Mervosh, Alabama Woman Who Was Shot While Pregnant is Charged
in Fetus’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
06/27/us/pregnant-woman-shot-marshae-jones.html [https://perma.cc/D4ZLMPF5].
35
Admissions Scandal Revives Story of Mom Imprisoned for Son’s Out of District Schooling, VIBE (Mar. 15, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.vibe.com/2019/03/
tanya-mcdowell-school-prison [https://perma.cc/AEE2-T978].
36
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19–20 (2003).
37
ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL 2 (2018).
38
Drug War Statistics, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE http://www.drugpolicy.org/is
sues/drug-war-statistics [https://perma.cc/77JW-QUGD] (last visited July 26,
2019).
39
PFAFF, supra note 2, at 206. But see Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing
Prosecutorial Power Through the Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV.
835, 856 (2018) (concluding that “it is misleading and counterproductive to claim
that [prosecutors], not legislators or judges,” are primarily responsible for mass
incarceration).
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After all, the prosecutor has the unfettered power to decide
whether to charge an individual or not,40 as well as to decide
which charges to bring.41 So much power that when the Court
in McCleskey v. Kemp42 was confronted with gross racial disparities in prosecutors’ decisions to seek the death penalty
even after controlling for thirty-nine other variables, it claimed
it was powerless to intercede.43 The prosecutor’s current control over the grand jury,44 and her ability to issue subpoenas,45
is similarly staggering. It is the prosecutor who decides
whether to negotiate a plea or not, and what terms to offer.46 In
many jurisdictions, the prosecutor in effect decides the sentence.47 With “nearly-unfettered and nearly-unreviewable discretion, prosecutors determine almost every aspect of a
defendant’s case.”48 In short, the prosecutor often functions as
the “police, prosecutor, magistrate, grand jury, petit jury, and
40
As Josh Bowers writes, prosecutors’ “prerogative to pursue easy legal cases
is essentially plenary: They may, but need not, consider normative guilt; they
may, but need not, exercise equitable discretion.” Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1655, 1659 (2010).
41
DAVIS, supra note 1, at 126–27, 140–41. One of the clearest examples of
this discretion arose out of the riots at the Attica Correctional Facility in 1971. As
the guards were ostensibly taking steps to regain control of the prison, they
retaliated by killing several prisoners and continued to assault and beat prisoners
after regaining control. When federal and state prosecutors declined to pursue
charges against the guards, prisoners and family members sued. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims, citing the discretionary power of
prosecutors. See Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d
375, 382 (2d Cir. 1973). For a historical perspective on this discretionary power,
see Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1323–52 (2002).
42
481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (citing prosecutorial discretion as a reason to not
disturb conviction, notwithstanding evidence of racial disparities in prosecutors’
charging decisions).
43
Id. at 308.
44
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 264 (1995) (concluding that the current system
“ensures that even reasonable, independent-minded jurors will defer to the prosecutor’s judgment”); Note, Restoring Legitimacy: The Grand Jury as the Prosecutor’s
Administrative Agency, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1205, 1208 (2017); see also Commonwealth v. Walczak, 979 N.E.2d 732, 752 (Mass. 2012) (Lenk, J., concurring) (“It
can fairly be said that the prosecutor holds all the cards before the grand jury.”).
45
Miriam H. Baer, Law Enforcement’s Lochner, MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 4–6, 30–31) (on file with author) (detailing rules that enable
government prosecutors and regulators to collect an immense amount of information relatively easily and quickly).
46
Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 5, at 1290–95.
47
SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, & RACHEL E. BARKOW, CRIMINAL
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1180 (10th ed. 2017).
48
John F. Pfaff, Criminal Punishment and the Politics of Place, 45 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 571, 575 (2018); see also Angela J. Davis, Meet the Criminal Justice
System’s Most Powerful Actors, APPEAL (May 29, 2018), https://theappeal.org/
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judge in one.”49 “He is the pivotal figure in the justice process.”50 Indeed, law itself “is qualified, and may even be nullified completely, by [a prosecutor’s] discretion.”51 And through
charges and lobbying, prosecutors play a role in law making,
enough to prompt Bill Stuntz to describe prosecutors as “the
criminal justice system’s real lawmakers.”52 It is little wonder
that Erik Luna and Marianne Wade have observed that, for all
intents and purposes, “the prosecutor is the criminal justice
system.”53 Or that a U.S. Attorney General acknowledged,
“[t]he prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”54 After all, because of
separation-of-powers requirements, courts are prohibited from
compelling prosecutors to file charges.55 And yet society rarely
questions this.56
None of this is to suggest that judges, legislators, or the
police play no role in the criminal justice system. They do,
meet-the-cj-systems-most-powerful-actors/ [https://perma.cc/3WAH-4GLT]
(“The power and discretion of prosecutors cannot be overstated.”).
49
RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION vii (1929).
50
Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 99, 100 (1976).
51
KADISH ET AL., supra note 47, at 1179; see also William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 506 (2001) (noting
that prosecutors “frequently decline to arrest or charge”).
52
Stuntz, supra note 51, at 506, 578; see also id. at 509 (“As criminal law
expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of police and
prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how
long.”); Bowers, supra note 40, at 1659–60 (“Laws are shells, and prosecutors
retain almost unfettered discretion to decide how to fill the void within.”).
53
Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1413, 1415 (2010).
54
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3,
3 (1940).
55
See, e.g., State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 401 N.W.2d 782,
791 (Wis. 1987) (holding that a state statute permitting courts to compel prosecution violated the separation-of-powers requirement of the constitution); cf. Steen
v. Appellate Div. Superior Court, 331 P.3d 136, 141–42 (Cal. 2014) (similar).
56
Nor can we simply dismiss this concentrated power with the consolation
that prosecutors, the overwhelming majority of whom are elected, are acting as
our representatives. While this is nominally true, it is also true that many are also
motivated by self-interest, including their future careers. See Capers, The Prosecutor’s Turn, supra note 5, at 1290–92; Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58 B.C. L. REV. 463, 472 (2017); Kay L.
Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Risk, Maturation, and Wrongful Conviction
Practice, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 648, 657–58 (2017); see also Jed Shugerman,
“The Rise of the Prosecutor Politicians”: Database of Prosecutorial Experience for
Justices, Circuit Judges, Governors, AGs, and Senators, 1880–2017, SHUGERBLOG
(July 7, 2017), https://shugerblog.com/2017/07/07/the-rise-of-the-prosecutorpoliticians-database-of-prosecutorial-experience-for-justices-circuit-judges-gover
nors-ags-and-senators-1880-2017/ [https://perma.cc/DMN7-L5D7] (theorizing
that prosecutors have historically used their position “as a stepping stone for
higher office”).
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especially the police.57 But their power pales in comparison to
that of prosecutors. While the police can make an arrest, in
most jurisdictions it is the prosecutor who must seek charges.
With respect to the power of judges, the federal judge Jed
Rakoff has described prosecutors as “the real rulers of the
American criminal justice system.”58 And the power of prosecutors has only grown, along with their numbers. In 1974,
there were approximately 17,000 state prosecutors nationwide.59 By 2001, that number had swollen to approximately
27,000, with a budget of $4.68 billion.60 A little over a decade
ago, Rachel Barkow described the prosecutor as a “leviathan.”61 No word seems more apt.
Thus far, I have argued that the stories of women suing to
force prosecutors to prosecute, the plutocratic “justice” that
Epstein initially received, and the other examples of under and
over enforcement, are linked by the unreviewable and monopolistic power of prosecutors to say yea or nay. But another link
is the relative powerlessness of the victims and by extension all
of us, especially those of us with the least power in society. At
the same time that prosecutors have amassed power, actual
victims have lost power. Consider that it is not uncommon for
prosecutors to demand the incarceration of domestic violence
victims for refusing to “cooperate” against their alleged abusers.62 Or consider a death penalty case in Colorado where
prosecutors blocked the victim’s family from telling jurors they
oppose the death penalty.63
Victims have lost power. This is especially true of victims
who are already disadvantaged because of gender, or race, or
57
See generally Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
171, 191–94 (2019) (discussing the power of the police to influence outcomes
before the charging stage).
58
Jed S. Rakoff, Why Prosecutors Rule the Criminal Justice System—And
What Can Be Done About It, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1429, 1436 (2017).
59
PATRICK F. HEALY, NATIONAL PROSECUTOR SURVEY (1977).
60
CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 193441, PROSECUTORS IN
STATE COURTS, 2001, at 4 (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
psc01.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P7E-SH6T].
61
Barkow, supra note 6, at 874.
62
Leigh Goodmark, The Impact of Prosecutorial Misconduct, Overreach, and
Misuse of Discretion on Gender Violence Victims, 123 DICK. L. REV. 627, 637–40
(2019) [hereinafter Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct] (discussing the practice
of using material witness warrants and incarceration to force domestic violence
victims to cooperate).
63
See Andrew Cohen, When Victims Speak Up in Court—In Defense of the
Criminals, ATLANTIC (Jan. 28, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2014/01/when-victims-speak-up-in-court-in-defense-of-the-criminals/
283345/ [https://perma.cc/A4AZ-N2JY].
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class, or sexuality.64 And it is true of the public more generally.
After all, nearly ninety-seven percent of all convictions are now
the result of pleas, a number so staggering that the Court finally acknowledged that plea bargaining “is the criminal justice
system.”65 The disappearing jury trial is itself an issue in
terms of justice; and as a key source of public input into guilt
or innocence, it also speaks to the public’s diminishing role in
criminal justice.66 “We now have not only an administrative
criminal justice system,” Ronald Wright and Marc Miller observe, “but one so dominant that trials take place in the
shadow of guilty pleas.”67 The jury trial that Alexis de Toqueville famously celebrated as a key component of democracy
and part of “the sovereignty of the people” has become the
exception, not the rule.68 In its place stands the prosecutor.
This accumulation of power by prosecutors and diminution in
power by the people has been gradual—Stephanos Bibas’ term
“legal drift”69 is appropriate here—and has been more than 300
years in the making. It has been so gradual that many of us
have come to take it for granted and see it as natural. It has
even been said that we became “careless of the continual
growth of power in the prosecuting attorney.”70 But things
were not always this way. We were not always so careless.
Originally, we, the people, had more power. The Part below
recounts this neglected history.
64
This is true in sexual assault cases. See, e.g., Capers, Real Women, Real
Rape, supra note 20, at 865–71 (arguing that black women face stereotypes about
their sexuality that weakens their protection under rape shield laws); Capers,
Real Rape Too, supra note 9, at 1297–1301 (discussing the lack of enforcement
against rape when the victim is male). It is true in capital cases. See, e.g., Randall
L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme
Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1390 (1988) (examining the Court’s failure to
protect black victims of murder); BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW
KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84, 192 (2017) (finding that
the race of victim matters in the pursuit of the death penalty; Garrett calls this the
“white lives matter” effect). It is true too of black and brown victims of police
violence.
65
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (stating that plea bargaining “is
not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system”)
(quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
66
See, e.g., John W. Keker, The Advent of the ‘Vanishing Trial’: Why Trials
Matter, 29 CHAMPION 32, 32 (2005) (noting the statistical decline of trials).
67
Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (2003).
68
See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 282–83 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., 1945) (1835).
69
STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2012).
70
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 11
(1931).
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II
WE, THE PEOPLE
While the notion of a crime victim pursing criminal charges
herself may seem “alien to modern America,”71 throughout colonial America and in England private prosecution was the
norm. To be sure, there were Attorneys General that handled
criminal matters, but for the most part their authority was
limited to cases that directly affected the Crown. For everyday
criminal matters, power resided with the people. This Part recounts this rarely discussed history and then suggests three
lessons that can be gleaned from it. The goal is not to pay
obeisance or offer blind fealty to our forebears by suggesting we
adopt whole cloth their system of private prosecution. Far from
it.72 Nor is the point merely to show that private prosecution is
part of our collective cultural DNA. Rather, the point is to show
that the public prosecutor, a “historical latecomer,”73 is not
inevitable. The point too is to show that the turn to public
prosecutors has had very real consequences in terms of the
expansion of criminal law and the contraction of the role of
victims.
A.

From Private Prosecution to Public Prosecutors

Today, the fact that public prosecutors bring cases in the
name of the “people” is for the most part taken for granted.74
71

JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 10 (1980).
Nor is the goal to idealize or romanticize the past, especially given evidence
that the private prosecution system became very imperfect in some places. One
such place was Philadelphia. As Allen Steinberg has documented, by the midnineteenth century the private prosecution system in Philadelphia was “subject to
exploitation, and often, relative to the formal law, quite corrupt.” ALLEN STEINBERG,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880 2 (1989).
Steinberg acknowledges that this was attributable, at least in part, to the unique
conditions of Philadelphia at the time:
The spatial and social density of life in Philadelphia produced the
circumstances in which ordinary people came to depend—and
prey—upon one another. All facets of popular life in Philadelphia
created the propensity toward litigation: poverty, the stress of bewildering social change, family tensions, ethnic and racial prejudice
and rivalry, the boisterousness of the streets and saloons—in short,
the everyday affairs of ordinary people living in crowded conditions
in, or on the edge of, poverty. The resolution of their quarrels and
spats, and their attempts to take advantage of one another or to
avenge injustices, took them regularly to court.
Id. at 16–17.
73
John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 313 (1973).
74
Cf. Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 250–55 (2019) (exploring and challenging the assumption
that prosecutors represent the people).
72
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But things were not always this way. It is not even part of our
long common law history.75 From the point of view of our forebears, it is the idea of public prosecutors having a monopoly
over—or indeed, any role at all in—everyday criminal matters
that would seem alien.76 As historian Joan Jacoby succinctly
put it, there was “no figure like the prosecutor at Jamestown or
Plymouth.”77 Rather, private prosecution was the norm, and
ingrained in the common law.
In common law . . . a crime [was] viewed not as an act against
the state, but rather as a wrong inflicted upon a victim. The
aggrieved victim, or an interested friend or relative, would
personally arrest and prosecute the offender, after which the
courts would adjudicate the matter much as they would a
contract dispute or a tortuous injury.78

Put differently, prosecution of criminal offenses “consisted
of charges being brought to the attention of the courts by individuals who had been wronged and who sought redress.”79 In
small, sparsely populated areas, justice existed without a
trained bar. In larger areas that could support a professional
judiciary, the model was still that of the rural justice-of-the75
See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6–7. (“The public prosecutor is not part
of America’s heritage from British common law.” Rather, the “prosecuting attorney is a distinctly American figure, and for distinctly American reasons.”); see also
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 10–13 (2003) (describing the English practice, common through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of public prosecutors handling treason cases only; otherwise, victims of
crimes served as their own prosecutors). Evidence suggests the average trial
lasted fifteen to twenty minutes. Id. at 16. Later, the Marian Committal Statute
would employ justices of the peace to play a more active role in private prosecutions by in effect issuing arrest warrants, compelling witnesses to appear, and in
some occasions assisting in the investigation by examining the prisoner and other
witnesses. Id. at 40–41. That said, even as recently as 1960, public prosecutions
accounted for only eight percent of the prosecutions in England, with the remaining prosecutions being brought by private individuals or the police, who under law
are acting as private citizens “interested in the maintenance of law and order.”
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 8.
76
John Langbein makes a similar observation. “We seldom appreciate,”
writes Langbein, “that [our] lawyerized criminal trial looks as striking from the
perspective of our own legal history as from that of comparative law.” John H.
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before The Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 263
(1978).
77
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6.
78
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6–8 (“[T]he British common law system for prosecution was essentially litigation between private parties.”); Albert J. Reiss, Jr.,
Public Prosecutors and Criminal Prosecution in the United States of America, 20
JURID. REV. 1, 4 (1975) (“Historically in England, while the Attorney-General, as
Law Officer of the Crown, was responsible for criminal prosecutions in which the
Crown was directly interested, the enforcement of criminal law was left almost
entirely to private individuals.”).
79
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 12–13.
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peace system then predominant in England. Either way, criminal justice in colonial America tended to be “the business of
laymen, not lawyers.”80 Indeed, at common law a citizen could
appeal directly to a grand jury to press charges.81 The criminal
justice system in the Bay Colony of Massachusetts was not
atypical.82 There, criminal justice was a decidedly private matter, with “simple courts [that] required no officer to represent
the government or to bring prosecution. The court itself represented the government; individuals brought charges against
law breakers.”83 This is not to say that the public prosecutor
was completely absent in the colonies. In fact, the colonies had
the equivalent of attorneys general. However, their function, as
in England,84 was limited to prosecuting matters that were of
particular interest to the Crown—in England, think the trial of
Sir Walter Raleigh; in the colonies, think the trial of British
soldiers for firing on colonists during the Boston Massacre.85
For everyday matters, “crime” was handled through private actors, the aggrieved against the alleged offender.86 For this reason, historians have concluded that the public prosecutor,

80
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 912 (2006); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 27 (1993) (“Colonial justice was a business of amateurs.”).
81
See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.4(b) (4th ed. 2015).
82
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 13.
83
Id. It also speaks volumes that the primary summary of colonial trials,
Criminal Trials in the Court of Assistants and Superior Court of Judicature,
1630–1700, contains no reference to prosecuting attorneys. See JOHN NOBLE,
CRIMINAL TRIALS IN THE COURT OF ASSISTANTS AND SUPERIOUR COURT OF JUDICATURE,
1630–1700 (1897).
84
Yue Ma, Exploring the Origins of Public Prosecution, 18 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV.
190, 195 (2008) (“Apart from his duty in civil courts, the [Crown’s] attorney general reviewed cases of crime to see if a royal interest was implicated.”). Early
English law distinguished between State trials, which involved matters of importance to the crown, and ordinary criminal cases. While lawyers were involved in
the former—Sir Walter Raleigh’s Case being a prime example—lawyers were typically not involved in the prosecution or defense of the latter. See Langbein, supra
note 73, at 316.
85
In addition to having prosecutorial authority over matters that directly
affected the Crown, Attorneys General also had the power of nolle prosequi to
dismiss privately brought prosecutions. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 728 n.65 (1996).
86
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 9 (“Before the American Revolution, the crime
victim maintained sole responsibility for apprehending and prosecuting the criminal suspect.”); Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function
to Private Actors, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 421 (2009) (“Although prosecutorial
power in the early colonies initially often was concentrated in a representative of
the Crown, the English tradition of private prosecution dominated the early American experience before the Revolution.”).
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“virtually unknown to the English system,”87 was “an historical
latecomer”88 to the American colonies.
There was one notable exception to this norm of private
prosecution, but this exception is traceable not to the English
but to the Dutch, who controlled New York and much of the
surrounding area as New Netherland from 1624 until 1673.89
In 1653, the Dutch established the area’s first courts in Manhattan, then known as New Amsterdam, and then in Elizabeth,
New Jersey, then called Bergen, in 1661.90 The Dutch system
included a schout, “a combination constable and court officer,”
whose duties included “presenting the case against the defendant and notifying all accused of the charges being levelled
against them.”91 “Citizens with complaints would go to the
schout, provide him with statements and available evidence; he
would notify the accused and make the presentation before the
court.”92 When the English wrested control from the Dutch in
1674 and New Amsterdam was rechristened New York, the
English kept intact the responsibilities of the schout, though
those responsibilities were now assigned to the sheriff.93 Indeed, as late as 1676 magistrates in English-controlled New
York were being instructed to administer justice according to
“former practice, not repugnant to the laws of the government.”94 When questioned about the propriety of maintaining
87
Kress, supra note 50, at 100. By the 17th century, criminal proceedings
were undertaken under the name of the King, but largely administered by victims
themselves. As Marie Manikis puts it, victims “remained in charge of arrests,
collecting evidence, and prosecutions.” Marie Manikis, Conceptualizing the Victim
Within Criminal Justice Processes in Common Law Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS 247, 248 (Darryl K. Brown et al. eds., 2019).
88
Langbein, supra note 73, at 313.
89
Most legal historians trace the American form of prosecution to the Dutch.
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 13–14; see also SANFORD H. KADISH & MONRAD G. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS, 1034 (2d ed. 1969)
(observing that the public prosecutor “is possibly a legacy from the Dutch administration in what is now New York”); Reiss, supra note 78, at 5 (identifying the
schout as the likely origin for American prosecutors). Other influences include the
English Attorney General and the French procureur. See Reiss, supra note 78, at
1–21; JACOBY, supra note 71, at 3. There is also the possibility that the colonists
recalled the hybrid role English Justices of the Peace assumed in the narrow class
of serious felonies. See generally Langbein, supra note 73, at 313–25 (discussing
this historical development). The end result was a “uniquely American prosecutor.” Joan E. Jacoby, The American Prosecutor in Historical Context, 39 PROSECUTOR 34, 37 (2005).
90
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 14.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Reiss, supra note 78, at 6–7.
94
Instructions for the Commissaries of Albany, Albany Ordinary Ct. 1676,
quoted in 2 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA 32 (2013).
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public prosecutions, essentially a “foreign” practice now being
exercised by the sheriff, the English colony responded by officially affirming the practice and issuing a written statement to
that effect.95
Even beyond the former Dutch possessions,96 small
changes were happening elsewhere that set the stage for public
prosecution. By 1666, the Attorney General for Maryland was
presenting criminal indictments to the grand jury.97 And by
1670, the Attorney General for Virginia was appearing in the
Court of Oyer and Terminer98 during all trials.99 Still, even as
public prosecutors entered the scene—a period that some
might call part of the “publicization of the private”100—their
power was understood to be limited. In “the eyes of the earliest
Americans, [the public prosecutor was] clearly a minor actor in
the court’s structure.”101 There was nothing approaching true
public prosecution until 1704, when Connecticut—which had
been partly under Dutch control—became the first colony to
abolish all private prosecutions and adopt in its place a system
of public prosecution.102 The Connecticut law provided:
Henceforth there shall be in every countie a sober, discreet
and religious person appointed by the countie courts, to be
atturney for the Queen . . . to prosecute and implead in the
lawe all criminals and to doe all other things necessary or
convenient as an atturney to suppresse vice and
immoralitie.103

95
W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney—A Historical
Puzzle, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 125, 137 (1952).
96
There is some evidence to suggest that the Dutch influence of using a
schout also extended to other Dutch possessions, including Delaware and Pennsylvania. JACOBY, supra note 71, at 14–15; see also Kress, supra note 50, at 104
(discussing Dutch influence despite a small Dutch settler population).
97
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 15. New Hampshire followed suit in 1683. Id.
98
Courts of Oyer and Terminer were essentially courts of general jurisdiction
hearing and determining criminal cases. See Melissa J. Mauck, Court of Oyer and
Terminer, in THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 360 (Wilbur R. Miller ed., 2012).
99
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 15.
100
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, REGULATORY CAPITALISM: HOW IT WORKS, IDEAS FOR MAKING
IT WORK BETTER 7–8 (2008); see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms
Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1285 n.1 (2003) (discussing the
opposite theory of “privatization”).
101
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 23.
102
Id. at 10.
103
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENF’T, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 7
(1931).
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Gradually, other colonies followed suit,104 though evidence
makes clear that public and private prosecution continued to
co-exist well into the American Revolution and the ratification
of the Constitution.105 But public prosecution was clearly in
the ascendance, such that by the time of the Civil War, private
prosecution was becoming a memory.106 Equally significant
changes were happening federally. Most notably, the federal
government established the Office of a United States Attorney
General and U.S. Attorneys through the Judiciary Act of
1789.107 Private prosecution was receding and public prosecution was becoming the norm, though a few remnants of the old
system remain even now.108 And public prosecutors, who went
104
As Joan Jacoby has observed, the “most apt description of the process that
has occurred in American criminal prosecution over the past 350 years is ‘evolution.’” JACOBY, supra note 71, at 6. Unfortunately, until fairly recently, little had
been written about the origin or history of public prosecutors. What can be safely
said is this:
[T]hat there was no figure like the prosecutor at Jamestown or Plymouth; that by the time of the Revolution an officer with some of his
basic characteristics had appeared in various colonies; that by the
civil war, there were District Attorneys quite like those we have in
the present era functioning in a large number of the states; and
that, at the present time, most states employ a single, locally elected
officer with primary responsibility and discretion to prosecute all
criminal matters within a defined political subdivision.
Id.
105
For example, the legal historian George Thomas, in his examination of
records from the New Jersey Court of Oyer and Terminer from 1749 to 1762,
found citizens routinely “acted as prosecutor by bringing criminal prosecutions
for most crimes. . . . [C]harges could be, and often were, laid by private citizens.”
George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal Law and Procedure: The Royal Colony of
New Jersey 1749–57, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 671, 679 (2005).
106
See Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal
Prosecution, the District Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ.
568, 569–70 (1984).
107
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat 73, 92–93. This is not to suggest
that, by the turn of the nineteenth century, public prosecution looked like prosecution as we know it today. For example, it is telling that “early Congresses
limited themselves to targeting activity that injured or interfered with the federal
government itself, its property, or its programs.” DANIEL C. RICHMAN ET AL., DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 3 (2d ed., 2018).
108
For example, in rape cases especially, it remains not uncommon for the
victim to be described as the “prosecutrix”—see, e.g., Stephens v. Morris, 756 F.
Supp. 1137, 1139 (N.D. Ind. 1991); State v. Rodriguez, 2012 WL 5358856, *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2012); Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 625 (1979); People v. Abbot, 19
Wend. (N.Y.) 192, 192 (1838); —a likely a carryover from the period when victims
prosecuted their own cases. Similarly, it is not infrequent for law enforcement to
ask a victim if he or she wants to “press charges.” While this likely originally
meant prosecute the case, now the term is simply used to see if the victim is
willing to testify and/or is sufficiently invested in the outcome to want the officer
to pursue charges. In many respects, the question is asked as a courtesy. In
addition, citizens still have the right to play a role in prosecution in a handful of
jurisdictions. See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Professionals, Politicos, and
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from being appointed to being elected,109 were on the road to
exercising the hegemonic power they wield today.110
There still remains the question of what prompted this
transition from private prosecutions to public prosecutions.
Although the historical record is thin111—unsurprising, given
that until recently, little had “been written about [the history of]
the prosecutor; scant research [was] conducted”112—it seems
safe to assume that contributing factors include the rise in
urbanization that accompanied the industrial revolution, together with the growing complexity of the law.113 Britain’s
dwindling influence in local matters, largely as a result of geography and the colonists’ preference for self-rule, likely played a
role as well; this would have allowed the colonies to experiment
with and embrace public prosecutors at a time when the British system was still predicated on private prosecution.114 It is
also possible that colonists viewed public prosecutors as a way
to relieve victims of the need to pursue their own cases115 or to
level the playing field between victims with means to pursue
private prosecutions, and victims without. In addition, public
prosecutors may have been viewed as a buffer against vindictive or unscrupulous complainants, or even biased grand jurors. As such, it is entirely possible that colonists viewed the
transition to public prosecutions as a net good. Joan Jacoby
suggests that “[t]he office of the prosecutor is the natural and
logical result of the legal, social, and political developments
that shaped the United States’ judicial system over the past
Crony Attorneys General: A Historical Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a
Case for Structural Independence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1987 (2019) (“Even
today, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, and
Texas allow private citizens to serve a role in criminal prosecutions.”).
109
For a discussion of this change, see JACOBY, supra note 71, at 19–28.
110
To be sure, the victims’ rights movement of the last few decades has resulted in victims normally having a right to make their views known. However, for
the most part this has resulted in a right of consultation and expression, such as
the right to submit victim impact statements. It has not resulted in dispositive
participation. See Manikis, supra note 87, at 257–60.
111
Jacoby herself concedes that it “is impossible to say exactly why the system
of private prosecution failed to root in the American colonies.” JACOBY, supra note
71, at 16; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 21 (describing the colonial criminal
justice system as “elusive. The further we look back in time, the dimmer the world
gets, and the stranger.”); Langbein, supra note 76, at 263–64 (lamenting that the
history “could be so little glimpsed from the conventional sources”).
112
JACOBY, supra note 71, at xv.
113
Id. at 16–19.
114
Id. at 11–12, 16–18.
115
She adds, “[t]he rejection of the general notion of a privileged class within
society also resulted in the rejection of ideas and forms that tended to protect that
privilege. In colonial America, public prosecution was an available and progressive remedy for a population dedicated to a more democratic society.” Id at 17.
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350 years. [The result] is a distinctly American figure, and for
distinctly American reasons.”116 Lawrence Friedman is even
more direct, arguing that “the concept of public responsibility
for prosecuting criminals rang a bell in the colonial mind.”117
While these explanations have an intuitive appeal, they
may obscure less generous reasons colonies had for embracing
public prosecutions. Criminologist Nils Christie’s observations
bear repeating: “Authorities have in time past shown considerable willingness, in representing the victim, to act as receivers
of the money or other property from the offender.”118 It is also
worth observing that the rise in public prosecutors, at least in
Virginia, may have had something to do with making sure
money went into its coffers; one problem with private prosecutions was that it made it easy for parties to bypass paying fees
to the court system.119 The legal historian Nicholas Parrillo
goes even further, noting that throughout much of the nineteenth century, “American public prosecutors made their income from fees, usually based on the number of cases they
brought or the number of convictions they won.”120 Stephanos
Bibas is specific: “Until the mid-nineteenth century, New York
prosecutors searched for evidence, drafted legal documents,
and empanelled juries upon victims’ paying them set fees.”121
All of this suggests that the colonies’ turn to public prosecution
may have been anything but disinterested.
Indeed, it is worth noting that even today, states may have
an incentive to maintain control over prosecutions. Just one
data point: victims rarely receive restitution from defendants,
even when the defendants have the financial wherewithal to
make restitution. Instead of restitution to victims, we have
moved to a system in which defendants are instead required to
make payments to courts and indirectly to prosecutors,
through court fees. Although in some places, courts require
that restitution take precedence over any fines or fees, other
116
Id. at 6. She adds “[t]he system [of private prosecutions] failed to hold
because it fit poorly with the concept that the new Americans had developed for
their government.” Id. at 10.
117
FRIEDMAN, supra note 80, at 30.
118
Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4 (1977).
119
As Joan Jacoby notes, this practice threatened “the financial solvency of
the courts.” This concern was weighty enough such that in 1711, Virginia’s
Attorney General ordered his deputies to involve themselves in all prosecutions to
ensure the state collected revenue from prosecutions. JACOBY, supra note 71, at
18.
120
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 255 (2013).
121
BIBAS, supra note 69, at 4.
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jurisdictions give no such priority. Furthermore, given that the
vast majority of indicted defendants are themselves poor, the
requirement that they pay court fees and fines likely means
defendants have less money at their disposal to make victims
whole.122
Although it is important to grasp why our norm of private
prosecutions disappeared—tellingly, the history is all but absent from criminal law casebooks123—the larger issue is that
such a norm existed. What lessons can we take from this history? I submit there are three, which I describe below.
B.

Three Lessons

It would be easy to view the history of private prosecutions,
and subsequent turn to public prosecutions, as merely that:
history. Dusty history. An interesting side note, or endnote, or
footnote, but nothing more. While such a view is tempting, it
would not be correct. In fact, understanding this history leads
to three important insights, all of which thicken our understanding of the criminal justice system we have now.
First, this history reveals how contingent prosecutors are.
We have become so inured to a system dependent on “insiders
who run the criminal justice system—judges, police, and especially prosecutors”124—that we tend to think of it as natural, as
just how things are. Knowing that the “very institution of public prosecution is largely an American invention”125 denaturalizes the current system. And it shows that other ways are
possible. Indeed, it reveals that a completely different way of
doing things—private prosecutions—is in our collective cultural DNA.
Second, this history prompts us to consider how the state
came to supplant the role of crime victims. Because this is
what happened as public prosecutors became the norm. Just
122
Putting a number on how much victims lose as a result of court fees and
fines is difficult to assess, in part because there is so little data, let alone uniform
data, on collection. It is also complicated by varying rules about what restitution
means or who is a victim. For example, New York, in a bit of legislative legerdemain, requires all convicted defendants to pay a “victim” fee, regardless of whether
the crime was victimless or not. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(1)(a) (Consol. 2020)
(requiring all persons convicted of a felony or misdemeanor to pay a “crime victim
assistance fee of twenty-five dollars”).
123
See, e.g., KADISH ET AL., supra note 47, at 1191–92 (discussing the availability of private prosecutions in Britain and other countries but omitting the history
of private prosecutions in the United States).
124
Bibas, supra note 80, at 911.
125
FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 54 n.22 (1969).
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consider. As early as 1777, the Pennsylvania Constitution declared that “all prosecutions shall commence in the name and
by the authority” of Pennsylvania, and that all charged crimes
violate the essential “peace and dignity of the same.”126 Although this language did not explicitly exclude actual victims,
the sentiment clearly did, such that the concept of criminal
justice soon conceived “of the criminal act to be a public occurrence and of society as a whole the ultimate victim.”127 A judge
of the Court of Pleas, New Haven County, Connecticut, observed as much in his 1926 article, The Office of Prosecutor in
Connecticut:
In all criminal cases in Connecticut “the state” is the
prosecutor. The offenses are aginst [sic] “the state.” The victim of the offense is not a “party” to the prosecution nor does
he occupy any relation to it other than that of a “witness,” an
interested witness mayhap, but none the less only a witness.
It is not necessary that the injured party make complaint . . . . He cannot in any way control the prosecution and
whether reluctant or no, he can be compelled like any other
witness to appear and testify.128

Just a few years later in Berger v. United States, the United
States Supreme Court used similar language to describe federal prosecutors: “The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty . . . .”129 Not only was the victim’s role supplanted,
the victim was, in effect, rendered superfluous. If anything,
courts now frown upon victims seeking criminal recourse. To
be sure, a handful of states today allow the use of private
prosecutors, but their use is limited and restricted to a narrow
range of cases.130 What is more common is for states to entirely bar private prosecutions.131 A decision from the Wiscon126
PA. CONST. OF 1776 ch. 2, §§ 21, 27. The following year, Vermont added
similar language to its constitution. See VT. CONST. OF 1777, ch.2, art. XXIV.
127
JACOBY, supra note 71, at 10.
128
Walter M. Pickett, The Office of Prosecutor in Connecticut, 17 J. AM. INST.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348, 356–57 (1926). Although this quote is often attributed to Malley v. Lane, 115 A. 674 (Conn. 1921), it is actually by the Honorable
Walter Pickett, a Connecticut state judge. Id.
129
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
130
The role of private attorneys is usually confined to assisting a public prosecutor and requires the consent of both the public prosecutor and the court. See
Reiss, supra note 78, at 1.
131
See, e.g., People v. Mun. Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645, 653–54 (Cal. Ct. App.
1972) (ruling that a private prosecution was inconsistent with California’s constitution and a statute which required district attorney’s approval for all prosecutions); In re Richland Cty. Magistrate’s Court, 699 S.E.2d 161, 163 (S.C. 2010)
(ruling that private prosecutions are inconsistent with the state’s constitution,
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sin Supreme Court speaks volumes. It not only reversed a
conviction secured with the aid of private counsel; it also proclaimed that the use of private counsel to assist in prosecutions is contrary to the state’s “public policy.”132
The end result is that, contrary to popular understanding,
a victim is not a “party” to a criminal prosecution. Nor, absent
unusual circumstances, does the crime victim have an attorney in court.133 Jack Kress’s observations in this regard bear
repeating:
The American district attorney . . . represents the state and
not the victim. This is why he rarely consults a victim with
regard to charging or plea negotiations and almost never informs him of the results of the case in which the victim may
have been injured or robbed. When the crime victim speaks
of the assistant district attorney as being his attorney, he is
spouting the myth of an adversary process and not the realities of a situation where he may never be informed of his
rights to receive compensation or to refuse to testify.134

Though this may seem a matter of little consequence—
after all, this is the system we have come to take for granted,
and the movement for crime victims’ rights has given victims
some role—this shift to public prosecutors as a monopoly
should give us pause. It means that victims have less agency, if
any at all. It certainly seems to fall short of political philosopher Jean Hampton’s notion that retributive punishment is a
way for the victim to show her value and worth.135 Though it
statutes, and case law, which “place the unfettered discretion to prosecute solely
in the prosecutor’s hands”).
132
State v. Peterson, 218 N.W. 367, 369 (Wis. 1928) (holding that a prosecution aided by private funds given by parties interested in the outcome invalidated
the conviction). In Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, the United States Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion and imposed a “categorical rule against
the appointment of an interested prosecutor.” Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987). Although Vuitton could be read as announcing
a constitutional rule, a closer reading makes clear the decision was predicated on
ethical and statutory rules and the Court’s supervisory authority, rather than
grounded on a constitutional mandate. There is also Robertson v. United States ex
rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272 (2010)—a case involving a private criminal contempt
action following a public prosecution—in which the Court dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. In his dissent from the dismissal, Chief Justice Roberts took issue with the “threshold issue” that there can a private criminal
action, but failed to articulate a constitutional basis for his rejection. Id. at 273.
133
Kress, supra note 50, at 107 (“In the American system of criminal justice,
the crime victim does not have an attorney in court.”).
134
Id.
135
See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1679–85 (1992); see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124–28 (1988) (“I am proposing that retributive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at the hands of the victim (either
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may seem as if I am going “far to seek disquietude,”136 ponder
for a moment what work public prosecution as a monopoly
actually does. Ponder to what extent it functions as a type of
erasure of the victim, or even as a revictimization. Perhaps no
one has interrogated this process more eloquently than Nils
Christie. In his oft-cited article Conflict as Property, Christie
observes:
The key element in a criminal proceeding is that the proceeding is converted from something between the concrete parties
into a conflict between one of the parties and the state. So, in
a modern criminal trial, two important things have happened. First, the parties are being represented. Secondly,
the one party that is represented by the state, namely the
victim, is so thoroughly represented that she or he for most of
the proceedings is pushed completely out of the arena, reduced to the triggerer-off of the whole thing. She or he is a
sort of double loser; first, vis-à-vis the offender, but secondly
and often in a more crippling manner by being denied rights
to full participation in what might have been one of the more
important ritual encounters in life. The victim has lost the
case to the state.137

Indeed, if the right to pursue cases is something that belongs to
us, something we have a property interest in, then public prosecution as a monopoly is akin to a taking of that right.138
Third, this history reveals how easily we have been lulled
into thinking of prosecution, once a means to redress wrongs to
real victims, as a means to redress wrongs to the state. Put
differently, the turn to public prosecution allowed the state not
only to usurp the role of crime victims; it also enabled the state
to create new crimes—and prop up old ones—in which the
state could claim the role of the victim. Instead of the difficulty
of wondering who the victim was if an interracial couple wanted
to marry, for example, the state could now rely on the notion
that the state itself was the victim. Ditto for two men having
consensual sex.139 Ditto for someone walking at night “with no
directly or indirectly through an agent of the victim’s, e.g., the state) that symbolizes the correct relative value of wrongdoer and victim.”).
136
5 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE PRELUDE OR, GROWTH OF A POET’S MIND: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL POEM 65 (1850).
137
Christie, supra note 118, at 3.
138
See id. at 1–4.
139
This is not to suggest that there were not early laws against interracial
marriage or same-sex sex. It is to suggest an explanation for the paucity of
prosecutions prior to the creation of public prosecutors. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 569 (2003) (noting that early laws prohibiting sodomy “do not seem
to have been enforced against consenting adults acting in private”); Robert A.
Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of
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apparent reason or business.”140 And of course, the ability of
the state to claim victim-status for victimless “crimes” continues today. It is this fiction that the state is harmed that allowed officers to forcibly arrest Eric Garner for selling loose
cigarettes.141 And to claim victimization when good Samaritans provide humanitarian aid in the form of water and food for
immigrants attempting to cross the border.142 And to seize
assets associated with victimless crimes as “forfeited” and add
them to the coffers of the “victim” state.143
Most importantly, the turn to public prosecutors and the
concomitant ability of the state to claim victimization have underwritten the War on Drugs, resulting in the incarceration of
more users than distributors. The creation of a system of state
prosecutors not only allowed the state to claim victim-status
when someone engages in the recreational use of drugs. It also
allowed the state to claim to be victimized by some drug use
more than other drug use. Hence, it could treat the use of
crack cocaine more severely than the use of cocaine, and more
severely than the current use of opioids, in ways that just happen to correlate with race.144 There is a reason why the War on
Drugs served as one of the major drivers of mass incarceration
Loving v. Virginia, 41 HOW. L.J. 229, 234–35 (1998) (noting the long history of
interracial couplings that went unprosecuted).
140
This is of course a reference to our history of arresting and prosecuting
outsiders for “loitering.” See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (finding a statute that required persons who loiter to provide “credible and reliable”
identification void for vagueness); Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law
Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1161–66 (1966) (criticizing the ability of
police to engage in various “preventive” police stops for potential loitering).
141
See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/
eric-garner-police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/7Z9BNDPK].
142
Lorne Matalon, Extending ‘Zero Tolerance’ to People Who Help Migrants
Along the Border, NPR (May 28, 2019, 4:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/
28/725716169/extending-zero-tolerance-to-people-who-help-migrants-alongthe-border [https://perma.cc/C5XA-PC8Y]
143
See ALEXANDER, supra note 12, at 78–84.
144
See Khiara M. Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White
Privilege and the Criminalization of Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L.
REV. 770, 788–92 (2020) (describing the differences in response to the crack
epidemic and the opioid epidemic); Ekow N. Yankah, When Addiction Has a White
Face, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/09/opinion/when-addiction-has-a-white-face.html [https://perma.cc/RQN6-3F3T] (similar). Cf. Kimani Paul-Emile, Making Sense of Drug Regulation: A Theory of Law
for Drug Control Policy, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 711, 729–30 (2010)
(“[T]he extent to which the drug is identified with racial minorities or other
marginalized groups will determine whether the drug will ultimately ever move
from the [criminal regulatory] regime.”).
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and overcriminalization,145 a reason why it is referred to as the
“raced” War on Drugs,146 and that reason has everything to do
with the advent of public prosecutors and the prosecution of
victimless crimes.
In short, our history of private prosecution and the turn to
public prosecution explains much about many of the seemingly
intractable problems in the criminal justice system.147 All of
this begs questions. What alternatives might open up if we
imagine a world without, or at least with far fewer, prosecutors? What might it mean to reject the notion of the state as the
“real” victim of crime and to instead imagine a criminal justice
system in which real victims have the power to decide whether
or not to seek recompense, whether in the form of monetary
compensation or restorative justice or punishment? These are
the questions I take up below.
III
BENEFITS
It has been said that “we are in the midst of a criminal
justice ‘moment,’ when extraordinary reform may be possible.”148 If that is true, and I am persuaded it is, what alternatives might open up if we imagine a world without prosecutors,
or at least with far fewer prosecutors? To be clear, I am not
suggesting a return to purely private prosecutions or a system
in which wealth inequality would allow some people to pursue
private actions and preclude others. But what if, instead of
145
Although only about seventeen percent of state prisoners in 2010 were
incarcerated due to drug crimes, that number alone is significant. Perhaps more
importantly, focusing solely on the percentage of inmates at any particular time
obscures the importance of the flow of inmates. Focusing on flow, it becomes
clear that more people are admitted to prison for drug crimes than for violent
crimes or property crimes. See Jonathan Rothwell, Drug Offenders in American
Prisons: The Critical Distinction Between Stock and Flow, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
(Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2015/
11/25/drug-offenders-in-american-prisons-the-critical-distinction-betweenstock-and-flow/ [https://perma.cc/25QK-LEVK].
146
Benjamin D. Steiner & Victor Argothy, White Addiction: Racial Inequality,
Racial Ideology, and the War on Drugs, 10 TEMP. POL. & C. R. L. REV. 443, 443
(2001) (describing the War on Drugs as a “raced war”).
147
For example, it is telling that in Allen Steinberg’s study of crime in Philadelphia during the nineteenth century, victimless crimes such as public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and vagrancy were usually state-initiated rather than
the result of private prosecutions, and that the number of prosecutions for victimless crimes increased with the expansion of the police. STEINBERG, supra note
72, at 29–30.
148
John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87
U. CHI. L. REV (forthcoming, 2020) (manuscript at 8) (on file with author).
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using the public fisc to solely fund public prosecutions, we
used that fisc to also fund private prosecutions?149
What might it mean to allow a victim of theft, for example,
to not only initiate a prosecution but also to prioritize, via prosecution, a return of the stolen item or financial damages? Or a
hate crime victim to decide what is more important to him,
punishment or an apology? Or a victim of domestic violence to
decide whether to pursue charges or not, to decide whether
incarceration of her partner is best for her or their children,
and to decide whether mandating anger management classes
or substance abuse classes might benefit her more? To be
sure, returning prosecutions to the people runs the risk of
empowering a few individuals to pursue personal vendettas
and malicious prosecutions.150 Yet even here, there is a
gatekeeping mechanism in the intermediary of first a judge and
then a grand jury to screen cases that lack probable cause, are
unmeritorious, or are malicious.151 We could even imagine jurisdictions requiring complainants to first post a bond of some
sort, on a sliding scale tied to ability to pay, before allowing
criminal cases to proceed, or allowing judges to impose sanctions for frivolous cases or cases brought solely to harass.152
Even after these screenings, there is yet another gatekeeper:
the trial jury. We would all do well to recall that the trial jury
originally had much more power; for de Tocqueville, the jury
149
Obviously, one of the major flaws of the Colonial system of private prosecutions was that victims who could afford to hire attorneys to prosecute on their
behalf had an advantage over victims who could not, and who were therefore left
to manage their cases pro se. See Fairfax, supra note 86, at 422–23.
150
See STEINBERG, supra note 72, at 42–43. This is not to suggest our current
system of public prosecution is free from personal vendettas and malicious
prosecutions.
151
The grand jury served the same gatekeeping function under the English
system of private prosecutions. See LANGBEIN, supra note 75, at 45. In theory at
least, the grand jury still serves that screening function today, and this is its key
role. See Roger A. Fairfax Jr., Does Grand Jury Discretion Have a Legitimate (and
Useful) Role to Play in Criminal Justice?, in GRAND JURY 2.0: MODERN PERSPECTIVES
ON THE GRAND JURY 57, 57–58 (Roger Anthony Fairfax, Jr., ed., 2011) (“Where the
grand jury truly adds value is through its ability to exercise robust discretion not
to indict where probable cause nevertheless exists—what some might term ‘grand
jury nullification.’”). However, in practice, the ability of the grand jury to serve
this role diminished as public prosecutors gained more power to charge, call
witnesses, and present evidence. See Raymond Moley, The Initiation of Criminal
Prosecutions by Indictment or Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403, 430 (1931) (observing that the modern prosecutor “seems to dominate the grand jury to such a
degree that its actions are in reality his own, and for that reason they should be
his nominally as well as actually”); see also R. Justin Miller, Informations or
Indictments in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV. 379, 397–99 (1924) (similar).
152
This could be similar to the Rule 11 sanctions that are already available for
civil cases. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
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functioned almost as a fourth branch of government, a check
against overreach.153
More importantly, what might it mean to reserve the default of public prosecution for only those matters where the
state truly is a victim, or where regulatory expertise is essential, or where non-divisible harm truly effects a swath of the
population, such as environmental crimes or crimes arising out
of financial regulation?154 Going one step further, what might
it mean to abandon public prosecution for “crimes” where the
state cannot claim victimization at all, “crimes” that run the
gamut from sex work to selling or possessing sex toys155 to
status crimes which essentially criminalize homelessness;156
in other words, “crimes” which should really be considered
non-crimes?
Again, I am not suggesting that we rely exclusively on private prosecutions where victims are involved. But I am suggesting a system where victims have a range of options,
including the option to pursue justice themselves. For example, consider a system in which a crime victim, say a burglary
victim, has five options. One, to prosecute the case herself, i.e.,
swearing out a complaint before a magistrate, seeking an indictment, and negotiating a disposition or taking the case to
trial. Two, assuming she would like to see the perpetrator
brought to justice, but would prefer not to pursue the case
herself, she could cede her right to prosecute the case to a
public prosecutor. Three, if she wants to retain control but
would like assistance in negotiating the criminal justice system, she could seek assistance from a prosecutor-advocate
provided by the state. Four, if she wants to retain control and
153
1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 311–18 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Library of Am. 2004) (1835).
154
This in fact was the practice before the advent of public prosecutors. In
addition, during parts of the 16th and 17th centuries in England, justices of the
peace functioned as “back-up prosecutors” when private prosecution was not
possible. See Langbein, supra note 73, at 323.
155
See, e.g., Richard Glover, Can’t Buy a Thrill: Substantive Due Process,
Equal Protection, and Criminalizing Sex Toys, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 555,
556 (2010); Brett Barrouquere, In Texas, Even Possession of a Sex Toy is Regulated, HOUST. CHRON. (May 21, 2017, 8:42 AM), https://www.chron.com/news/
politics/texas/article/In-Texas-even-possession-of-a-sex-toy-is-11161211.php
[https://perma.cc/LZX2-Z2R5].
156
See, e.g., RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S, at 2–3 (2016) (describing vagrancy laws as
a means of controlling those who threatened the social order); Jamelia N. Morgan,
Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming, 2021) (manuscript at
13–15) (on file with author) (discussing how disorderly conduct laws exclude from
public spaces those homeless who engage in survival strategies).
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would like assistance in negotiating the criminal justice system, but would prefer not to rely on the state at all, she could
seek assistance from a prosecutor advocate not provided by the
state but instead by not-for-profits or community groups,
which already are staking for themselves a larger role in the
criminal justice system.157 And finally, five, perhaps the most
important option and one that has for too long gone undertheorized: she would have the option to “let the matter go” and not
pursue prosecution at all. The common denominator in these
options is that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the initial
power to decide resides not with the state but with the victim
herself and by extension with the people.
To be sure, one can imagine numerous situations—the
aforementioned extraordinary circumstances—in which we
might want the state to have the primary decision-making authority. These may include cases involving child abuse, certain
cases of domestic violence, other types of cases involving victim/witness coercion and intimidation, homicide cases, or
cases in which the victim is deceased and has no next-of-kin
with decision making authority. The point here is not to exhaust the types of cases in which we may welcome state intervention as the primary decision-maker. The point is to suggest
that in most instances, the state’s usurpations of the victim’s
role should not be automatic. Rather, the state should have to
make some kind of showing to a judge before being permitted to
supplant the victim’s authority to decide.
Although I am bracketing in this Article how a move to
private prosecutions can be effectuated, one could easily imagine progressive prosecutors themselves playing a significant
role. For example, progressive prosecutors could train incoming line assistants to serve as prosecutor-advocates to work for
actual crime victims (much in the way public defense lawyers
work for their clients) and assist them with an array of options,
ranging from restorative justice to prosecution. This alone
would set some of the groundwork necessary for a system that

157
For examples of the ways community members are asserting more control
in the justice system, see Jocelyn Simonson, Bail Nullification, 115 Mich. L. Rev.
585, 587 (2017) (describing the growth of community groups that “use bail funds
to post bail on behalf of strangers, using a revolving pool of money”); Jocelyn
Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2173, 2181–83 (2014) (describing the power of the courtroom audience, “born
from its physical presence in the courtroom,” and the rise of “courtwatch” groups
in disadvantaged communities).
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shifts power from public prosecutors and gives it to the
people.158
Having sketched out—concededly in broad strokes—what
options a victim would have if we returned power to the people,
and having gestured to how such a transition could be effected,
the remainder of this Part turns to some of the benefits that
might flow from such a realignment of power.
One, instead of a system in which prosecutors decide
which cases are worthy of pursuit, “we the people,” including
those of us who have traditionally had little power, would now
have the ability to seek justice and to achieve it ourselves.
Consider again the failure of many prosecutors to pursue sex
assault prosecutions.159 Consider too the blue on black violence160 that the Black Lives Matter movement has brought
into the national conversation. Police kill about 1,000 civilians
every year161 and use excessive force in many multiples more—
and yet prosecutors, who have a symbiotic relationship with
the police, are loath to bring charges against officers.162 These
cases also reflect what scholars have identified, and what many
black and brown people know firsthand, as under-enforce158
I am thinking here of jurisdictions experimenting with providing victims
more decision-making authority in prosecutions. The words of Richard Briffault,
who in turn was channeling Justice Brandeis, come to mind:
Many years ago, Justice Brandeis famously offered a defense of
federalism in terms of the possibility that state autonomy provides
for innovation. As he observed, “a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.” Well, if
the fifty states are laboratories for public policy formation, then
surely the 3,000 counties and 15,000 municipalities provide logarithmically more opportunities for innovation, experimentation, and
reform. Thousands of local governments provide thousands of arenas for innovation.
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. L. 253, 259
(2004) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
159
See supra notes 18 to 30 and accompanying text.
160
See Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People:
The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125,
127–130 (2017).
161
John Sullivan et al., Four Years in a Row, Police Nationwide Fatally Shoot
Nearly 1,000 People, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019, 11:26 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/four-years-in-a-row-police-nationwide-fatally-shoot-nearly-1000-people/2019/02/07/0cb3b098-020f-11e9-912282e98f91ee6f_story.html [https://perma.cc/BT4K-XCKP].
162
Barry Friedman puts it bluntly. “As we have seen, left to their own devices,
lawmakers who must stand for election would rather not regulate the police.”
BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 101 (2017). See also
Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L REV. 1447, 1449–52
(2006) (applying conflicts-of-interest law to argue that local prosecutors should
not handle cases involving police-defendants).
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ment.163 To the extent prosecutors decline to pursue charges
notwithstanding probable cause to proceed or the victim’s (or
victim’s family’s) wishes, these prosecutors engage in what
Austin Sarat might call “lawful lawlessness,”164 and what
others have called “the ‘mortality’ of cases,”165 both of which
are entirely “legal” given a system in which prosecutors hold a
monopoly over criminal prosecutions and discretion. Now
again, imagine a system in which the victim has an array of
options, all of which ultimately vest her with the choice of how
and when to prosecute, subject to screening by the grand jury,
the petit jury, and a judge? Consider a system that allows her
to request the type of redress that would “reaffirm [her] worth,”
to borrow from Jean Hampton,166 a redress that might include
restorative justice and rehabilitation. Consider too that for
many victims, “the opportunity to shape what repair looks like
can be the most transformative part of the accountability
process.”167
Equally important, victims would also have the right not to
pursue charges, to “let the matter go.” We can all imagine a
victim of a petty crime being willing to let the matter go, especially in situations where the victim senses the harm to the
perpetrator and his community will far outweigh the benefit to
herself. Consider the case Ewing v. California, in which Gary
Ewing, a drug addict, was prosecuted for stealing three golf
clubs from a sports shop to presumably pawn and feed his
habit.168 Even here we can imagine that the owner of the
sports shop might decline to pursue charges, especially if he
knew Ewing would be sentenced to twenty-five years to life, a
sentence the Supreme Court would affirm. Or we can imagine
a victim being open to reaching an out of court resolution with
the offender.169 The important thing is that all victims should
163
See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 19–20 (1997); Alexandra
Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1716–22 (2006).
164
Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George Ryan,
Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307, 1312
(2004).
165
Samuel Walker, Origins of the Contemporary Criminal Justice Paradigm:
The American Bar Foundation Survey, 1953–1969, 9 JUST. Q. 47, 53 (1992).
166
MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 135, at 126.
167
DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE, MASS INCARCERATION, AND A
ROAD TO REPAIR 114 (2019). “Trauma,” Sered adds, “is fundamentally about
powerlessness, so having the power to direct the future that arises out of the past
can contribute significantly to a person’s healing process.” Id.
168
538 U.S. 11, 17–20 (2003).
169
See, e.g., Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
911, 917–18 (2007) (discussing the possibility of private mediation as an alternative to the criminal justice system).
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be able to exercise this type of agency, even victims of domestic
violence.170 Too often, domestic violence victims are revictimized by the state, forced to participate in a prosecution resulting in incarceration even when incarceration of their
abusers causes more harm than good.171 Even here, after ensuring that victims are aware of all of the options and the risk,
the decision should lie with the victim whether to pursue prosecution and if so, on what terms.172 For example, the victim
may be satisfied with the issuance of a peace warrant that
labels the perpetrator’s behavior as a potential offense and requires the perpetrator to keep the peace going forward or face
prosecution.173 Indeed, having the power to chart one’s own
course is one way to make victims whole.
Two, when we transfer power from state prosecutors to the
people, we may realize that many of the victimless “crimes” we
take for granted are not deserving of prosecution at all. Drug
use and distribution are the biggest examples since they are
significant drivers of our incarceration rates, but this would
also include the criminalization of minor acts Devon Carbado
170
I emphasize domestic violence victims because, as a society, we have become used to deeming such victims incapable of making rational decisions. We
engage in a type of paternalism, or even maternalism. See Bennett Capers, On
‘Violence Against Women,’ 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 347, 360 (2016).
171
See Goodmark, Prosecutorial Misconduct, supra note 62, at 638–40; Leigh
Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2009); cf.
Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 53, 56–58 (2006)
(describing a panoply of prosecutorial practices that deliberately override the
preferences of domestic violence victims, including the imposition of protective
orders that function as “de facto divorce”).
172
In a sense, this is a return. As Roger Fairfax has observed, “[c]omplainants
in the system of private prosecution could, and often did, settle their criminal
cases out of court.” Fairfax, supra note 86, at 423. In particular, Critical Race
Theorists have attended to why a victim may view pursuing charges as not in the
victim’s best interest, especially when pursuing charges primarily benefits the
state and disadvantages communities. See, e.g., Regina Austin, “The Black Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769,
1774 (1992) (exploring the practice in black communities of identifying with lawbreakers “as an act of defiance” against the larger polity); Kimberle Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1991) (noting that minority victims of
domestic violence are sometimes reluctant to request police intervention, given “a
police force that is frequently hostile.”); cf. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1995)
(arguing that “for pragmatic and political reasons, the black community is better
off when some nonviolent lawbreakers remain in the community rather than go to
prison”).
173
For more on peace warrants, see LAURA F. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR
PEACE 73–74 (2009). For a discussion of peace warrants in the context of domestic
violence, see Ariela Gross, Beyond Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race
and Slavery, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 640, 658 (2001).
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puts under the umbrella of “mass criminalization,” such as
spitting in public.174
Put differently, returning decision-making authority to victims of crime might prompt us to reconsider the very concept of
victimless crimes, and recognize how much the harm principle—once the sine qua non of legal intervention—has been collapsed.175 To be sure, the state may be harmed by a variety of
acts. But there are other acts that we criminalize—again, think
of sex work or recreational drug use—where harm to the state
seems nonexistent or at best is attenuated. Once we divide
crimes into those that involve an actual victim and those where
the state is a truly a victim (such as tax fraud), we are likely to
discover that there are numerous “crimes” that do not fall into
either category. Recognizing this might in turn spur us to
question why truly victimless crimes—again, crimes where
neither the state nor the people are victims—are designated as
crimes at all. We might realize that so many of the “crimes” we
think of as criminal justice problems are best addressed in
other ways. We might for example recognize that the best way
to address the opioid crisis or homelessness is not through
criminal prosecution but through a public health response.
The same may true of other crises, such as the plague of gun
violence.176 In brief, returning criminal decision-making power
to the people has the potential to remake our entire system of
criminal justice.
Three, returning decision-making power to crime victims
may very well lead to collateral benefits to criminal justice jurisprudence. Right now, the problem is not just that public
prosecutors wield enormous power. The problem is also that
174
Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A Provisional Model of Some of
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1487 (2016).
175
The “harm principle,” traceable to John Stuart Mill’s essay ON LIBERTY,
posits that the state should deprive someone of liberty only when necessary to
prevent harm to others. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport
ed., 1978) (1859). H.L.A. Hart also embraced this formulation. See H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 60-61, 75–77 (1963). For a discussion of how the
harm principle has been watered down as to become meaningless and devolved to
permit state intervention to police almost any act, see Bernard E. Harcourt, The
Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113–16 (1999).
176
See, e.g., DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 8–26 (rev. ed.
2017) (arguing for treating gun violence as a public health problem and using
tools of prevention); Zachary R. Rowan et al., Proximal Predictors of Gun Violence
Among Adolescent Males Involved in Crime, 43 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 250, 256–57
(2019) (similar); see also Ben Green et al., Modeling Contagion Through Social
Networks to Explain and Predict Gunshot Violence in Chicago, 2006 to 2014, 177
JAMA Internal Med. 326, 330–31 (2017) (modeling gun violence as a social contagion and tracking its spread).
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their power is almost completely unchecked.177 Most troubling, the Court, reading the due process and equal protection
clauses narrowly, has limited its supervision. For example, the
Court has imposed no limits on a prosecutor’s ability to
threaten draconian sentences to “induce” pleas. Thus, a threat
to subject a defendant to a mandatory life sentence if he failed
to take a five-year plea for passing a false check in the amount
of $88.30 was held constitutional in Bordenkircher v. Hayes.178
Similarly, although the Court in Brady v. Maryland179 read the
due process clause as requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory information, the Court neutralized this directive by including a materiality requirement and by allowing prosecutors
to postpone disclosure until the eve of trial.180 Beyond this,
Brady provides nothing to the overwhelming majority of defendants who plead guilty in lieu of trial.181 Even when it
comes to racial discrimination in jury selection, the Court has
provided little oversight and has instead created a burdenshifting test in Batson v. Kentucky182 that insulates all but the
most “unapologetically bigoted or painfully unimaginative”
prosecutors.183 Part of the reason the Court provides so little
oversight has to do with the trust courts extend to public prosecutors.184 Courts are unlikely to extend such automatic trust
to lay prosecutors who prosecute their own cases directly or
with the aid of a prosecutor advocate. And this may result in
collateral benefits. Courts and legislative bodies, faced with
nonprofessional prosecutors, will likely respond by bringing
177
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 6, at 885–86 (noting that the expansion of
prosecutorial power occurred without corresponding checks by Congress or the
Supreme Court).
178
434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (concluding that “in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea
bargaining, there is no . . . element of punishment or retaliation so long as the
accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer”).
179
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
180
Id. at 87.
181
For an overview of a prosecutor’s disclosure requirements under Brady
and some of the decision’s flaws, see Baer, supra note 3, at 11–15.
182
476 U.S. 80 (1986).
183
Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More
than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1075, 1075 (2011). For additional critiques of Batson, see Robin Charlow,
Tolerating Deception and Discrimination After Batson, 50 STAN. L. REV. 9, 10–16
(1997); Camille A. Nelson, Batson, O.J., and Snyder: Lessons from an Intersecting
Trilogy, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1687, 1688–92 (2008).
184
Some of this is attributable to the fact that a disproportionate number of
trial judges are former prosecutors. This is not a recent phenomenon. See Norman Lefstein, Book Review, 56 TEMP. L. Q. 1101, 1110–11 (1983) (reviewing ALAN
M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982)) (noting that a “high percentage of judges
are former prosecutors”).
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more oversight to all prosecutors, something that scholars
such as Kenneth Culp Davis and Bill Stuntz have long advocated.185 If this happens, we may all very well be the
beneficiaries.
Four relates to the benefit above but focuses directly on the
impact on society. Allowing victims to directly prosecute defendants who have harmed them—again subject to the
gatekeeping of the grand jury, the petit jury, and the judge—
may well prompt us to rethink how we see the adversarial
process in the criminal justice system. We tend to think of
public prosecutors as representing “the people” and we fund
them accordingly. Indeed, the French philosopher Michel Foucault might even say we have been disciplined into aligning
ourselves with prosecutors.186 It is quite likely, however, that
as more crime victims assert their right to seek redress directly,
this notion that “the people” stand on one side of the “v.” while
the defendant stands alone on the other will start to crumble.187 We will begin to see victims and defendants. This alone
will neutralize some of the power public prosecutors have. But
it may also do something else equally consequential: it may
prompt us to rethink why we provide so much funding to public
prosecutors and comparatively so little to public defenders.188
185
See, e.g., KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
207–14 (1969) (noting the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms to check
prosecutorial misconduct); William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of
Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law 26–28 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub.
Law, Working Paper No. 120, 2005), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=854284 (arguing for a standard that would require prosecutors to
show that the threatened sentence has been proposed in similar cases or require
that the judge find that the threatened sentence was fair and proportionate to the
defendant’s criminal conduct).
186
For a discussion of how criminal procedure jurisprudence and practices
discipline all of us in a Foucauldian sense, see I. Bennett Capers, Criminal Procedure and the Good Citizen, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 653, 671–79 (2018). Here, we have
been disciplined to think of the prosecutor as on our side. More troubling for
defendants and the notion of fair trials, we have also been disciplined to think of
ourselves on the side of the prosecutor.
187
Cf. Simonson, supra note 74, at 286–87, 294–95 (arguing for a criminal
justice system that allows “the people” to play a role on both sides of the “v.”).
188
See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1046–54 (2006) (describing
the various funding levels in different states); Barkow, supra note 6, at 882 (“Public defender offices are woefully underfunded and understaffed.”); Martin Guggenheim, The People’s Right to a Well-Funded Indigent Defender System, 36 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 395, 401–05 (2012) (describing a “crisis” in funding for
indigent defense). This change may even prompt us to support the appointment
of a Defender General, a public official to represent the collective interests of
defendants—as a counterpart to the Solicitor General. See Daniel Epps & William
Ortman, The Defender General, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021).
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This alone can do much to level the playing field between prosecution and defense and get us closer to a process that is fair
and consistent with justice.
Five, shifting power back to the people can bring prosecution out of the shadows and into the open as something we do.
This may at first seem a matter of little consequence, but in fact
the consequences are far-reaching. As we begin to think of
prosecution as something we do, we may question the constant
ratcheting up of the criminal codes. Consider just one statistic:
as of 2003 over 4,000 separate federal crimes were in the U.S.
federal code,189 and almost half of these “crimes” were added to
the code after 1970.190 We may come to see criminalization for
what it is: “an expansionist power, pushing into its neighbors.”191 More significantly, we may come to see “that sometimes it makes sense to ‘keep the law at bay.’ ”192 And we may
realize, as Robert Ellickson did years ago, that the notion that
legal institutions are always necessary to maintain order is
false. Neighbors can solve problems without state intervention.
Even strangers can solve problems without state intervention.
We can have order without law.193
Six, a system in which “we the people,” including those of
us who have traditionally had little power, are empowered to
seek justice may be our best hope of resurrecting mercy, forgiveness,194 and what Joshua Kleinfeld might call normative
reconstruction.195 This argument may strike many as contrary
189
JOHN S. BAKER, JR., & DALE E. BENNETT, FEDERALIST SOC’Y FOR LAW & PUB.
POLICY STUDIES, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIME LEGISLATION 3
(2004).
190
AM. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998)) (emphasis omitted) (“More than 40% of the
federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have been enacted since
1970.”).
191
Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L.
REV. 1367, 1372 (2017).
192
I. Bennett Capers, Afrofuturism, Critical Race Theory, and Policing in the
Year 2044, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2019) (quoting Regina Austin, “The Black
Community,” Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
1769, 1808 (1992)).
193
See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (analyzing how a rural community uses informal norms to
settle disagreements).
194
For an exploration of the role law can play in facilitating forgiveness, see
Martha Minow, Forgiveness, Law, and Justice, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1615, 1620–26
(2015).
195
See Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (2016) (offering reconstructivism as an
alternative theory of punishment and stating that reconstructivism views punishment as “a way of reconstructing a violated social order in the wake of an attack”).
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to common knowledge; we think of ourselves as living in a
society where penal populism predominates. If we were to take
a snapshot of the country at the time states were adopting
three-strike laws, embracing sentences of life without parole,
creating sex offender registries, or passing the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act, this view of us as punitive
would be true.196 But it becomes less true when we take a
longer view. After all, for the roughly two centuries between the
1770s and the 1970s, the American criminal justice system
was, for the most part, one of “reasonable compassion.”197
Now, as this country wrestles with mass incarceration and the
knowledge that we have the highest incarceration rate in the
world,198 the tide seems to be turning. Certainly, the problem
of mass incarceration is framing national politics. Even the
Court is trending towards mercy. Consider its decision in
Miller v. Alabama, barring life without parole for juveniles,199 a
decision that the Court in Montgomery v. Louisiana held should
be applied retroactively,200 or Madison v. Alabama, overturning
a death sentence for a prisoner who, because of a mental disability, could not understand the reason for his execution,201 or

196

See PETER K. ENNS, INCARCERATION NATION: HOW THE UNITED STATES BECAME
MOST PUNITIVE DEMOCRACY IN THE WORLD 24–25, 31–38 (2016) (surveying punitiveness and concluding that the U.S. public became more punitive from the mid1960s to the mid 1990s); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 17–77 (2017) (detailing the rash of tough on crime
legislation).
197
Kleinfeld writes that popular reforms:
[S]wept through the young country from the Founding through the
mid-nineteenth century, substantially eliminating punishments of
the body (corporal punishment and maiming); aiming to abolish and
succeeding in limiting capital punishment (abolition was a major
issue just after the Founding); experimenting with rehabilitative
prisons; and codifying substantive criminal law so as to reduce
pockets of harshness and arbitrariness and transfer control from
the judiciary to the more popularly accountable legislature. This
penal moderation continued for most of the twentieth century: from
the late 1920s through the early 1970s, America’s incarceration rate
was fairly low, fairly stable, and roughly equal to what it is in Western European countries today.
Kleinfeld, supra note 191, at 1369 (footnotes omitted). Kleinfeld acknowledges
one major exception to this “reasonable compassion”: many communities’ punitive attitudes with respect to African-Americans. Id.
198
World Prison Populations, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/
spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm. [https://perma.cc/8JUS-Q7B7]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
199
567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
200
136 S.Ct. 718, 736 (2016).
201
139 S.Ct. 718, 731 (2019).
THE
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even Brown v. Plata, upholding an order requiring California to
reduce its prison population to address overcrowding.202
More importantly, there is evidence to suggest that on the
individual level, mercy may have purchase. For example, Paul
Robinson’s empirical work suggests that, contrary to popular
assumptions, what people believe is the appropriate punishment tends to be less than what the law actually prescribes.203
The same, it turns out, is true for victims of crime. A recent
study from the National Survey of Victims’ Views found that
“the overwhelming majority of crime victims believe that the
criminal justice system relies too heavily on incarceration, and
strongly prefer investments in prevention and treatment to
more spending on prisons and jails.”204 This holds true for
victims of violent crime.205 By a three to one margin, “victims
prefer holding people accountable through options beyond just
prison, such as rehabilitation, mental health treatment, drug
treatment, community supervision, or community service.”206
The same study found that, by a more than two to one margin,
victims of violent crime believe prison is more likely to cause
individuals to commit more crimes rather than rehabilitate
them.207 Danielle Sered’s work with crime victims yielded similar responses, with the majority of victims, given the option,
preferring a restorative justice process to incarceration. As she
writes, these are
survivors . . . who participated in the criminal justice system.
They are among the less than half of victims who called the
police and are part of the even smaller subgroup who continued their engagement through the grand jury process. They
are people who initially chose a path that could lead to
prison. They are people who have suffered serious violence—
knives to their bodies, guns to their heads, lacerations to
their livers, punctured lungs—and have engaged in the criminal justice system in a way likely to result in the incarceration of the person who hurt them. Even among these victims,
when another option is offered, 90 percent choose something
202

563 U.S. 493, 499–502 (2011).
Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility and the
Challenge of Social Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1574–80 (2017).
204
See ALLIANCE FOR SAFETY AND JUSTICE, CRIME SURVIVORS SPEAK: THE FIRSTEVER NATIONAL SURVEY OF VICTIMS’ VIEWS ON SAFETY AND JUSTICE 13 (2016), https://
allianceforsafetyandjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/Crime%20Sur
vivors%20Speak%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9N4-PTTE].
205
Id. at 16.
206
Id. at 20.
207
Id. at 21.
203
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other than the very incarceration they were initially
pursuing.208

Put simply, more and more often victims are resisting the notion that incarceration will right the wrong and are instead
insisting on different models of justice, including models that
bypass the criminal justice system entirely.209 Indeed, although the public assumption is that victim interests align
with the state, as Marie Manikis observes it “can also align with
those of defendants.”210
There is another reason why shifting power to victims may
foster mercy. One reason why prosecutors tend to be indifferent to incarceration is that local prosecutors bear little of the
cost of incarceration, which is usually borne by the state.211
The same is true with respect to citizens who, absent an incarcerated family member, externalize the cost of incarceration,
and thus can easily support tough-on-crime measures. But
this dynamic changes when the expectation is that victims of
crimes will initiate actions, or at least, decide to cede their
actions to the state. Citizens who will have to internalize the
cost of pursuing cases—and here, I mean the cost of time
rather than money—are very likely to think twice before pursuing minor cases. Department stores are already doing just this
208

SERED, supra note 167, at 42.
For a persuasive discussion of the promise of the restorative justice model
even in cases of violence, see SERED, supra note 167, at 129–56. For a discussion
of an alternative to traditional restorative justice, which in some iterations functions as “an adjunct to the criminal justice system while simultaneously denying
its enmeshment in traditional probationary and sentencing regimes,” see M. Eve
Hanan, Decriminalizing Violence: A Critique of Restorative Justiceand Proposal for
Diversionary Mediation, 46 N.M. L. REV. 123, 125 (2016). Other significant readings include: Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Restorative Justice and the Jewish Question, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 533, 548–54 (2003) (showing that restorative justice also
has support in religion, including Christianity and Jewish law); Mia Mingus,
Transformative Justice: A Brief Description, TRANSFORM HARM, https://transformharm.org/transformative-justice-a-brief-description/ [https://perma.cc/
3ARB-BHSB] (last visited Jan. 30, 2020) (describing the framework of “transformative justice,” championed by prison abolitionist Miriame Kaba); Daniel H. Greenwood, Restorative Justice and the Jewish Question, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 533,
548–54 (2003) (showing that restorative justice also has support in religion, including Christianity and Jewish law); Stefanie Mundhenk Harrelson, I Was Sexually Assaulted, And I Believe Incarcerating Rapists Doesn’t Help Victims Like Me,
APPEAL (July 18, 2019), https://theappeal.org/i-was-sexually-assaulted-and-ibelieve-incarcerating-rapists-doesnt-help-victims-like-me/ [https://perma.cc/
3L2Y-DKB3].
210
Manikis, supra note 87, at 264.
211
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Rationing Criminal Justice, 116 MICH. L. REV. 187, 189, 196–204 (2017); Adam M. Gershowitz, Consolidating Local Criminal Justice: Should the Prosecutors Control the Jails?, 51 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 677, 679 (2016); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 82 (2011); STUNTZ, supra note 8, at 289.
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by declining to call authorities, allowing first-time shoplifters to
avoid the snare of the criminal justice system.212 A very similar
dynamic is possible when decision making rests with victims.
This too is a form of mercy.
For the most part, I have bracketed the issue of race
throughout this Article, even though “many of the problems
that plague the criminal justice system—mass incarceration,
over-criminalization, and capital punishment, to name just a
few—are only intelligible through the lens of race.”213 But
when it comes to thinking about the role returning prosecution
to the people can play in fostering mercy, discussing race is
essential. Although many imagine victims as white and defendants as black, the fact is that most crime remains intraracial—in no small part because our country still remains residentially segregated along lines of race. For many black and
brown victims of crime, and black and brown crime defendants, this means that their cases are largely mediated through
criminal justice actors—including prosecutors—who are overwhelmingly white.214 While this may seem unproblematic, it

212
See John Rappaport, Criminal Justice, Inc., 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2251,
2266–76 (2018).
213
Capers, supra note 192, at 5.
214
A 2015 study found that ninety-five of elected prosecutors are white, and
that sixty-six of states that elect prosecutors have no black prosecutors at all.
Latinos make up just 1.7% of elected prosecutors. WOMEN DONORS NETWORK,
Justice for All: Key Findings, (2015) https://wholeads.us/justice/wp-content/
themes/phase2/pdf/key-findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/C27S-T5H2]. Evidence
suggests that minorities are also underrepresented among line prosecutors, given
that minorities in general are underrepresented in the legal profession, with African-Americans making up only five percent of all attorneys, and Latinos another
five percent. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA PROFILE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 8 (Aug. 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/news/2019/08/
ProfileOfProfession-total-hi.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5E6-LADN]. Although there
is no national data on diversity in district attorneys’ offices, a study of demographic data regarding prosecutors in California found that whites made up seventy percent of all prosecutors, even though they comprise just thirty-eight
percent of the state’s population. Debbie Mukamal & David Alan Sklansky, OpEd: A Study of California Prosecutors Finds a Lack of Diversity, LA TIMES (July 29,
2015, 4:43 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0729-sklanskymukamal-diversity-prosecutors-california-20150729-story.html [https://
perma.cc/WG69-ZF6X]. As Bryan Stevenson has observed, while society has paid
attention to diversity in policing, “we haven’t paid much attention to prosecutors.
And that role is a role that has largely been occupied by white men and that has
changed almost not at all in the last 30 years.” Report Highlights Lack of Racial
Diversity Among U.S. Prosecutors, NPR (July 7, 2015, 4:35 PM), https://www.npr.
org/2015/07/07/420913863/report-highlights-lack-of-racial-diversity-amongu-s-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/AUQ5-ECMG] (interviewing Bryan
Stevenson).
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“skews [the] decision-making”215 and leaves little room for racial empathy or for consideration of how prosecution and punishment may positively or negatively impact black and brown
communities.216 In contrast, to the extent a victim brings the
case herself and confronts the person who harmed her—again,
most crimes are intra-racial—she is likely to confront a member of her own community, someone who looks like her, someone of whom she might say, regardless of her religious or nonreligious belief, “but for the grace of god.” Given that sixtythree percent of blacks and forty-eight percent of Latinx have a
family member who has been in jail or prison,217 she is likely to
know firsthand the harm that prisons can do, not just to the
incarcerated but also to their families.218 She is likely to intuitively grasp the “legal estrangement” communities suffer as a
result of over-policing.219 She is likely to know too that a felony
conviction may mean the disenfranchisement not only of the
perpetrator but the decreased voting power of her community,
especially given statistics that “one in every 13 black adults
could not vote as the result of a felony conviction.”220 In large
cities where prosecutor’s offices dole out what has been called
“assembly-line justice,”221 shifting the decision to prosecute to
victims may finally allow room for alternatives to prosecution—
including a demand for greater community resources to prevent crime in the future.222 Even more radically, it may begin a
215
Jessica Brown, If It Pleases the Prosecution, KNOWABLEMAGAZINE.ORG (May
22, 2019) (quoting David Alan Sklansky). Danielle Sered makes a similar point.
“One way that racial inequity manifests is in shaping who gets to decide what
happens in response to harm.” SERED, supra note 167, at 153.
216
See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1281–97 (2004)
(exploring the collateral consequences of mass imprisonment of AfricanAmericans).
217
Peter K. Enns et al., What Percentage of Americans Have Ever Had a Family
Member Incarcerated?: Evidence from the Family History of Incarceration Survey
(FamHIS), 5 SOCIUS 1, 1 (2019).
218
For an exploration of the impact of incarceration on the families of prisoners, see generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND
FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2007).
219
See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2066–68 (2017).
220
Jean Chung, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer
6 (2019), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchise
ment-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/UAK9-YRXL].
221
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36 (1972).
222
As James Forman documents, high crime communities often want a range
of options to address crime—not just more police but also more jobs, better
schools, and better housing. Those requests are usually answered by jurisdictions providing more police or tough-on-crimes laws, but little else. See FORMAN,
supra note 196, at 12–13. For a discussion of some of the promising programs
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conversation about the state’s role in creating the conditions of
crime—through structural oppression and wealth inequality—
in the first place.223
I have initially focused on the racial gap between most
black and brown communities and most prosecutors because it
most clearly illuminates the possibility of mercy, but a similar
possibility may exist even absent a racial gap between communities and prosecutors. This is because even where both victim
and perpetrator are white—again, most crime is intra-racial—it
is still likely that they are from the same community, and that
this community may very well be different—in terms of median
wealth, educational attainment, and social capital—from the
one to which the prosecutor belongs. Indeed, there is one other
factor that is also likely to be similar. While the percentage of
blacks (63%) who have had an immediate family member incarcerated may seem staggering, the fact is that we have incarcerated so many in this country that the number is also staggering
for whites, 42% of whom have had an immediate family who
was incarcerated.224 All of this opens up the possibility of empathy. Indeed, when a victim has the right to confront his
offender—in short, when a victim has a counterpart to the right
a defendant has under the Sixth Amendment to confront his
accuser—it is not only the possibility of empathy that opens
up. It is also the possibility for recognition and even connection.225 All of this can contribute to a re-imagination and perhigh crime communities are currently pursuing, see Hannah Sassaman, To Heal
Violence, Divest from Police and Jails, and Invest in Proven Community Solutions,
PHIL. INQUIRER (July 10, 2019, 7:10 AM), https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/com
mentary/philadelphia-homicides-summer-2019-policing-incarceration-201907
10.html [https://perma.cc/VUE2-SWDD]; Elizabeth Van Brocklin, What Gun Violence Prevention Looks Like When it Focuses on the Communities Hurt the Most,
THETRACE.ORG (July 10, 2019), https://www.thetrace.org/2019/07/gun-violenceprevention-communities-of-color-funding/ [https://perma.cc/4FD6-XLHT].
223
For example, a recent study revealed that boys who grow up at the bottom
ten percent of the income distribution are twenty times more likely to be incarcerated than children born in top ten percent. ADAM LOONEY & NICHOLAS TURNER,
WORK AND OPPORTUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION 11–13 (. 2018), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/
es_20180314_looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X6Q-YPAD].
That same study revealed that “[t]hree years prior to incarceration, only 49 percent of prime-age men are employed, and, when employed, their median earnings
were only $6,250. Only 13 percent earned more than $15,000.” Id. at 1. See also
Angela P. Harris, Heteropatriarchy Kills: Challenging Gender Violence in a Prison
Nation, 37 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 58 (2011) (“[E]ach incident of personal
violence should be understood in a larger context of structural violence.”).
224
Enns et al., supra note 217, at 1.
225
One can think of this as a practical application of social network theory, or
the notion that most people are connected by about six degrees of separation. See
Stanley Milgram, The Small-World Problem, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 61, 64–65 (1967)
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haps confluence of what justice will restore the victim, what
justice will benefit us all, what justice is truly transformative,226 and what justice is just. To be sure, not every victim
will be inclined to show mercy to someone who harmed her,
even if that person is from her community. But a few will.227
And these acts of mercy may very well have a signaling effect
that encourages others to do the same.228
There is one more thing to say about mercy and that is this:
just as some victims may be inclined to show mercy, others will
be inclined in the opposite direction. They will insist on retribution, and more.229 These victims may subscribe to the notion that “it [is] highly desirable that criminals should be hated,
[and] that the punishments inflicted upon them should be so
contrived as to give expression to that hatred.”230 But even
here, there is hope for mercy at the societal level. A society that
learns that the owner of a bakery, after being robbed of $50.75,
sought and obtained a sentence of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole because he could—i.e., because the
crime of theft allows for a sentence of life without parole231—
(finding that random residents of Omaha, Nebraska could be connected to a target
person in Boston, Massachusetts through a median of five individuals). A prerequisite for finding these connections is communication. Assuming nonexceptionalism, a victim who actually communicates with a defendant is likely to find a
similar chain of connections, whether it be that they attended the same elementary school, or that their mothers went to the same church, or something else.
Any connection can change how the victim thinks about justice. Tellingly, in
John Guare’s play Six Degrees of Separation, which was based on true events, it is
the fact that the protagonists recognize a connection to the man that has deceived
them that motivates their decision to attempt to help him. JOHN GUARE, SIX
DEGREES OF SEPARATION 102–116 (1990).
226
On transformative justice, see Mingus, supra note 209.
227
A recent example is that of the family of Ann Margaret Grosmaire. After
arguing with Grosmaire on and off for nearly two days, her boyfriend of three
years shot her in the face, then walked into a police station to confess to the
crime. Although the prosecutor charged the boyfriend with first-degree murder,
exposing him to a mandatory life sentence, the victim’s family pleaded for less. In
short, the victim’s family asked for mercy. See Paul Tullis, Can Forgiveness Play a
Role in Criminal Justice?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.
com/2013/01/06/magazine/can-forgiveness-play-a-role-in-criminal-jus
tice.html [https://perma.cc/MY3M-C56S].
228
Cf. Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 36, 39 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds.,
2006) (defining mercy as “an act of benevolence or compassion that reduces what
is owed”).
229
Put differently, they will disregard negative retributivism, the theory that
no one should be punished more than he deserves; i.e., that retribution also
functions as an upper limit on punishment.
230
2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 82
(1883).
231
This is a reference to the recent case of Alvin Kennard, freed after being
sentenced to life without parole and serving 35 years in prison for stealing $50.75
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may very well revisit its penal code to reduce the maximum
penalty. In other words, isolated acts of punitiveness may
prompt a societal move to adjust maximum penalties downward across the board. This too is a type of mercy.
* * * * *
The benefits described above are not the only benefits that
will flow from ending the monopoly public prosecutors have on
criminal cases and from restoring agency to victims of crime,
and by extension, to all of us. One can readily think of other
benefits, such as enhancing participatory citizenship232 in a
way that merely electing prosecutors does not.233 There is even
reason to believe that ending the monopoly public prosecutors
have on justice may have a deterrent effect when it comes to
criminal offending.234 Restoring agency to victims can even
have an impact on policing.235 And these are just some of the
benefits. Again, “[s]ince subject position is everything in my
analysis of the law,”236 allow me to add two more that resonate
with my own work: This project is deeply feminist and this
project is consonant with Critical Race Theory. At this time,
when female victims of crime are less likely to be granted
from as bakery. See Antonia Noori Farzan, He Stole $50 and Got Life Without
Parole. 35 Years Later, He’s Coming Home, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2019, 6:34 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/29/alvin-kennard-theftyears-alabama/ [https://perma.cc/QW6G-YDVF].
232
As Nils Christie observes, the ability to exercise agency in seeking justice
after victimization represents “a potential for activity, for participation.” Christie,
supra note 118, at 7.
233
See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 581, 582 (2009) (noting that incumbent prosecutors rarely face challengers;
this means voters rarely “learn about the incumbent’s performance in office . . . to
make an informed judgment about the quality of criminal enforcement in their
district”). Consider too the recent revelation that a union representing corrections
officers is the biggest contributor to the election campaign of District Attorney
Darcel Clark in New York. See Ese Olumhense & Josefa Velasquez, Correction
Officers Are Top Donors to Unopposed Bronx DA Darcel Clark, CITY (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://thecity.nyc/2019/11/correction-officers-are-top-donors-to-bronx-dadarcel-clark.html [https://perma.cc/2ZC6-J55J].
234
Consider, as but one example, the problem of sexual assault. One reason
so few victims come forward is because of their justified skepticism that anything
will be done. See discussion supra accompanying notes 18–21. Perpetrators of
sexual violence likely know this. However, this dynamic could change if perpetrators realized that victims themselves could make a showing of probable cause to a
judge to secure an arrest warrant, could make their case before the grand jury to
pursue an indictment—in short, that victims could seek justice directly.
235
A system in which victims can bring cases has the potential to redirect
police resources to crimes that actual victims care about, rather than merely
following the agenda of an elected prosecutor who need only appeal to a fraction of
her constituents.
236
WILLIAMS, supra note 11, at 3.
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agency to make their own decisions, this project gives power to
them. At a time when minority victims are rarely heard, this
project gives power to them. It demonstrates a “commitment to
radical critique of the law . . . and . . . radical emancipation by
the law.”237 It recognizes that true change is possible only
through a “fundamental interrogation of all power.”238 These
too are benefits, and we should take them seriously. And we
should recognize that all of these benefits bring direct democracy to criminal justice; and that in itself is a good thing.
One can imagine other benefits as well once we empower
people to reclaim prosecutorial agency. To seek direct criminal
recourse to vindicate harms to them. To contest who is a victim
and who is a perpetrator. To contest what should be criminalized and what should not. Especially when we think of “the
people” as meaning all of “the people,” including minorities and
other individuals who have historically been relegated to the
margins and who, even now, are not necessarily represented by
majority rule. There is a long history of marginalized individuals, through their own initiative, challenging the state and the
status quo, pushing the law to “make America what America
must become.”239 One has only to recall the many slaves such
as Elizabeth Freeman, also known as Mum Bett, who acting on
their own petitioned courts for their freedom. Mum Bett was
not only successful; her case also set in motion the abolishment of slavery in Massachusetts.240 There is Homer Plessy,
who deliberately sat in a white only car in Louisiana to challenge de jure racial segregation,241 and Fred Korematsu, who
refused to report to a Japanese internment camp.242 There are
people who acted individually and people who acted collectively. There are the women who in 1872 marched to the polls
and voted knowing they would be arrested; and the hundreds
of drag queens and gay men and women who on June 28, 1969,
refused police orders to disperse the Stonewall Inn.243 Even on
237
Derrick A. Bell, Who’s Afraid of Critical Race Theory?, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV.
893, 899 (1995).
238
Capers, supra note 192, at 27.
239
JAMES BALDWIN, FIRE NEXT TIME 24 (1963) (“[G]reat men have done great
things here, and will again, and we can make America what America must
become.”).
240
See Massachusetts Constitution and the Abolition of Slavery, MASS.GOV,
https://www.mass.gov/guides/massachusetts-constitution-and-the-abolitionof-slavery [https://perma.cc/F74N-4KC2] (last visited Feb. 19, 2020).
241
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
242
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
243
See Symposium, Stonewall at 25, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 277, 277–78
(1994).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-6\CRN601.txt

1606

unknown

Seq: 46

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

3-NOV-20

7:23

[Vol. 105:1561

the criminal side, we are the beneficiaries of individuals who
refused to accept the law from on high and instead insisted on
the right to shape the law themselves. Consider Clarence
Gideon, of Gideon v. Wainwright244 fame, who handwrote his
petition to appeal saying how unfair it was he’d been tried
without the assistance of counsel.245 Or consider Dollree
Mapp, of Mapp v. Ohio, who insisted that police should have a
warrant before searching her home.246 To be sure, these individuals were reacting to state action. But what if these individuals, indeed everyone, had the power to seek justice without
the intermediary—or more bluntly, without the court blocking—of a public prosecutor. Imagine if Dollree Mapp had been
empowered not just to verbally protest the warrantless search
of her home but also to argue that the officer’s reaching into her
bosom was a battery. Imagine if she was empowered to argue
that the warrantless search should itself be criminal. Imagine
too if Epstein’s sexual assault victims—all outsiders, all relatively powerless—had been empowered to demand account of
him and to say themselves what they thought was criminal. All
of this could contribute to what Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres
call “demosprudence,” meaning action instigated by “ordinary
people” to change “the people who make the law and the landscape in which that law is made.”247 In her examination of
criminal cases in North Carolina and South Carolina in the
decades after the Revolutionary War, Laura Edwards found
something that to modern readers may sound strange: “Everyone participated in the identification of offenses, the resolution
of conflicts, and the definition of law.”248 Indeed, she found
that even those most marginalized—women, children, poor
whites, and slaves—had direct access to localized law and
could shape that law.249 I said earlier that my goal is not to pay
244
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing a state’s obligation to provide counsel for
those criminal defendants who cannot afford it.)
245
Facts and Case Summary – Gideon v. Wainwright, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/educationalactivities/facts-and-case-summary-gideon-v-wainwright [https://perma.cc/
PA4A-57HQ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020).
246
367 U.S. 643, 644–46 (1961) (making the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule binding on the states).
247
Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the Wind: Notes Towards a Demosprudence of Law and Social Movements, 123 YALE L.J. 2740, 2749–50 (2014).
248
EDWARDS, supra note 173, at 7.
249
Id. at 7, 82; see also id. at 65–66 (“‘The people’ did not exist as the abstraction that provided the basis for government . . . . They figured as flesh-and-blood
individuals, whose presence and opinions informed the entire process: people
constituted the legal process, and law was what emerged through their interactions with one another. . . . [They saw] the legal system as something directly
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obeisance or offer blind fealty to the past. But clearly there are
aspects of this past that are worth pursuing.
Importantly, as we think about restoring prosecutorial
agency to ourselves, we should be open to other changes that
might follow. For starters, we can imagine a corresponding
expansion of the role of juries.250 For example, Josh Bowers
has persuasively argued that grand juries should play a role in
charging decisions.251 We might even see a revival of grand
jury reports, a process by which grand juries can issue a report
critical of a defendant in lieu of an indictment.252 Along a
similar vein, Laura Appleman has persuasively argued that we
should form “bail juries” to play a role in bail determinations253
and that we should also give juries a role in plea bargaining.254
And numerous scholars have called for juries to play a bigger
role in sentencing,255 including the role of nullification.256
connected to them, and they expected it to respond as such, wherever it might be
located.”).
250
See Laura I. Appleman, Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and
Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1413, 1415–19 (2017) (discussing the power
of early juries and how the jury trial served as “the conduit for the community’s
expression of democratic justice”). To be sure, the power of the grand jury has
been drastically curtailed, reduced to a “rubber stamp.” In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Douglas even lamented that the grand jury, “having been conceived as a
bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Executive.”
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). However,
there is no reason why the original power of the grand jury cannot be restored.
This vision would also restore the grand jury to its proper screening function.
Indeed, it has been said that grand juries during the colonial period exercised
more independence than grand juries in England. In brief, it was left “to the grand
jury to ferret out wrongdoing and present accusations.” Leipold, supra note 44, at
283.
251
Josh Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 319, 321, 329–35 (2012) (focusing on low-level mala prohibita
crimes and proposing the use of misdemeanor grand juries to decide not just the
technical question of whether probable cause exists but also “the normative question of whether charges are reasonable”).
252
Such reports were once common in public corruption cases as a way for a
grand jury to note its displeasure with the actions of public officials in a manner
short of an indictment. See SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 3.01, 3.03 (1986).
253
Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1363–66 (2012).
254
Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 741–50 (2010).
255
See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L.
REV. 311, 312–316 (2003) (arguing that jury sentencing makes sense from a
historical, theoretical, and practical perspective); Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for
Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951, 953–56 (2003) (arguing that historical, constitutional, empirical, and policy reasons call for jury sentencing); Adriaan Lanni,
Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108
YALE L.J. 1775 (1999) (arguing that jury sentencing would be the most effective
means to implement contemporary sentencing goals).
256
See Butler, supra note 172, at 679.
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Still, one can imagine the push back. To some, the idea of
a world with fewer public prosecutors may conjure images of
lawlessness or criminals run amok, even if history suggests
otherwise. As is the case whenever the status quo is called into
question, there is sure to be hesitation. But even that hesitation should prompt us to think “why public prosecutors,” and
to rethink the power we have given them. Indeed, allow me to
go a step further. It is a foundational tenet of Critical Race
Theory that we should always “ask the other question.”257 This
includes asking, “[w]ho benefits from the status quo . . . ?”258
Who benefits from the status quo of allowing public prosecutors to decide what cases to pursue? Who benefits when the
predominance of public prosecutors enables the state to create
a swath of victimless crimes and claim itself as the victim?
Who benefits? And who does not?
Of course, there will be much work in implementing the
change I have proposed. But it is not impossible work. There
are examples elsewhere that we can look to and build on. England and Wales provide mechanisms by which victims can
seek administrative and judicial review of a public prosecutor’s
decision to prosecute or not.259 Separate and apart from this
ability to challenge prosecutorial decision making, England
and Wales still permit citizens to initiate private prosecutions.
In Poland and Germany, victims can function as secondary
prosecutors to directly oversee public prosecutions.260 Both
countries allow for victims to apply for legal aid so that they can
be assisted by counsel. Spain allows citizens to bring an
261 There are
´
acusación popular to prosecute delito publico.
countries where the families of homicide victims are the ones
who decide whether to seek punishment, financial compensation, or forgiveness.262 In short, there are models to borrow
from or to improve upon. There is certainly interest.263 There
257
Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991).
258
Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 905
(2018).
259
Manikis, supra note 87, at 260–61.
260
See Johanna Göhler, Victim Rights in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 87, at 267, 277–78.
261
Id. at 277 n.65.
262
See Manikis, supra note 87, at 257; see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, Quesa
Crimes, in THE ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 203, 203–08 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 1982) (describing Quesas and Diyya systems where the victim, or his family,
can demand punishment).
263
For example, the Vera Institute of Justice is exploring the possibility of
providing funding to select prosecutors’ offices so that those offices can explore
implementing more radical, community-oriented ways of effecting justice. (Phone
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are examples here.264 There is precedent. Again, private prosecution is in our cultural DNA. It is part of who we are. More
importantly, it is part of who we are capable of becoming.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, all is not right in our criminal system. Our prisons
are shockingly overcrowded. Millions of people cycle through
jails each year, the overwhelming majority for victimless
crimes. One in every three adults has a criminal record. Yet at
the same time, so many of the crimes that matter to victims go
unaddressed. One in three homicides in this country go unprosecuted. Sexual assaults are hardly prosecuted at all. One
wonders if the word “justice” should be applied at all. The
question—really, the pressing question—is what can we do
about it.
The ambition of this Article has been to argue for a different
way. It has been to turn attention to the public prosecutors
who wield power that can only be described as monopolistic,
and surface how recent, indeed how contingent, public prosecutors are. It has been to recall a time when victims, and by
extension all of us, had the power to choose when to prosecute,
and when to not. And it has been to suggest that, in this
criminal justice moment, we open ourselves up to the possibility of real change. Radical change. It is time to consider shifting power from prosecutors to the people they purport to
represent. The benefits, after all, are manifold.

call with Joseph Margulies, Professor of Law and Gov’t, Cornell University, regarding Vera Institute project (Sept. 3, 2019).
264
See supra notes 157–58, 169, 193, 250–56, 259–62.
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